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STRUCTURAL RIGHTS AND INCORPORATION 
F. Andrew Hessick* & Elizabeth Fisher** 
Under the selective incorporation doctrine, provisions in the Bill of Rights are applied against the states 
if they are fundamental to the American scheme of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in this nation’s history. 
By focusing solely on the importance of rights, this doctrine fails to account for the effect of incorporating 
a right on the states. This Article challenges this approach. It identifies a category of rights whose incor-
poration most deeply intrudes on state sovereignty. These rights do not simply create individual entitle-
ments; they also have structural features by dictating which government institutions may exercise which 
government powers. These “structural rights” comprise the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury, the 
Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury, and the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury. The Article 
argues that these rights should not be incorporated because the prerogative to allocate government powers 
is one of the core powers of state sovereignty, and the Fourteenth Amendment does not purport to strip 
the states of that power. In addition to protecting the state power to arrange government, adopting a theory 
against incorporating structural rights would explain the Court’s refusal to incorporate the grand jury 
and civil jury rights, as well as doctrinal anomalies surrounding incorporation of the criminal jury right. 
 
Adopting the theory against incorporating structural rights would have several implications. The most 
significant is that it would result in the deincorporation of the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury. 
The consequence of this deincorporation is not only that the U.S. Constitution would not oblige states to 
provide juries in criminal cases but also that the doctrine announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
which prohibits sentencing schemes that allowed judges to make factual findings altering the range of 
punishment, would no longer apply against the states. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has said that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires states to observe rights that are fundamental to our concept of 
ordered liberty or deeply rooted in our nation’s history.1 The prevailing view is 
that under this test, all the provisions in the Bill of Rights apply against the 
states, even if some of those rights have not yet been formally incorporated. 
After all, that a right is enumerated in the Bill of Rights is strong evidence that 
 
*  Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. J.D., Yale Law 
School. B.A., Dartmouth College. 
** Law clerk to the Honorable David B. Sentelle. J.D., University of North Carolina School of Law. 
B.S., North Carolina State University. Thanks to Akhil Amar, Aditya Bamzai, Carissa Hessick, Jeff Hirsch, 
Kurt Lash, and Bill Marshall for their helpful comments and encouragement. 
1.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010). 
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the right is fundamental and deeply rooted in our history.2 Thus, as Justice Gor-
such asked last term: “[H]ere we are in 2018 . . . still litigating incorporation of 
the Bill of Rights. Really?”3 
But the answer to Justice Gorsuch’s question is hardly obvious. Although 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to observe rights, it does not specify 
which rights the states must honor.4 This ambiguity has led to disagreement.5 
Scholars and Justices over the years have proposed a variety of theories of in-
corporation, ranging from those that consider the Fourteenth Amendment to 
incorporate none of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to those that suggest 
the Amendment incorporates all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.6 It was 
not until 100 years after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment that the 
Court adopted the current “selective incorporation” test that asks whether the 
right is fundamental to our concept of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in our 
nation’s history.7 
This selective incorporation doctrine is not based on the text of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Nothing in the two provisions of the Amendment cited as 
the basis for incorporation—the Privileges or Immunities Clause8 and the Due 
 
2.  1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.5(a), at 797–98 (4th ed. 2015) (“[C]onsid-
erable weight is given to the very presence of a right within the Bill of Rights, since that presence in itself 
establishes that historically a substantial body of opinion viewed that right as essential to the fairness of the 
common law system.”). 
3.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091), 2018 
WL 6200334, at *32. Justice Kavanaugh went even further, stating, “Isn’t it just too late in the day to argue 
that any of the Bill of Rights is not incorporated?” Id. at 33. 
4.  The two provisions that have been cited as a basis for incorporation are the Due Process Clause, 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”), and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, id. (“No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
5.  The ambiguity in the text has led to a vast body of scholarship on the ratification history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 181–214 (1998); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1387 (1992); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
Part III: Andrew Johnson and the Constitutional Referendum of 1866, 101 GEO. L.J. 1275, 1276 (2013); Kurt T. Lash, 
The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
99 GEO. L.J. 329, 337 (2011); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and 
Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241, 1244 (2010); see generally Charles Fairman, Does the 
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). 
6.  Compare, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing for total 
incorporation), and CURTIS, supra note 5, at 219–20 (same), with, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98–
99 (1908) (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not extend the Bill of Rights against the states), 
and Fairman, supra note 5, at 138–39 (arguing against incorporation). See also AMAR, supra note 5, at 218 (press-
ing a theory of “refined incorporation” under which provisions designed to protect the states are not incor-
porated). 
7.  See 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.5(a), at 795 (“During the 1960s, the prevailing due process 
position shifted . . . to the selective incorporation doctrine.”). 
8.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
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Process Clause9—singles out rights that are fundamental or historically im-
portant for special treatment. Nor is there any historical foundation for the 
doctrine.10 Instead, the doctrine is the product of Justices’ efforts to implement 
the values that they believe underlie the Fourteenth Amendment.11 
But the set of values captured by the selective incorporation test is too nar-
row. By asking whether a right is fundamental or historically rooted, the test 
focuses on the importance of the right to individuals. The test does not account 
for the effect that incorporating a right would have on the states12—as the 
Court has explicitly acknowledged.13 
The failure to account for the effect on the states is unwarranted. Under 
the dual-sovereignty system established by the U.S. Constitution, states are sov-
ereign entities.14 They have all the powers of sovereignty except to the extent 
that the Constitution strips states of those powers. Recognizing the central im-
portance of state sovereignty to our constitutional order, the Court has inter-
preted many constitutional provisions to include implicit exceptions to prevent 
interference with the operation of state government.15 
Any judge-made doctrine of incorporation should likewise take pains to 
avoid trammeling on state power. Although the Fourteenth Amendment im-
posed significant new restrictions on the states, it did not abrogate state sover-
eignty. Because the incorporation of each provision of the Bill of Rights limits 
the states’ ability to act, the intrusion on state interests should inform determi-
nations about which rights are incorporated against the states. 
 
9.  Id. (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”). 
10.  See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 934 
(1965) (“Whatever one’s views about the historical support for . . . [the] wholesale incorporation theory, it 
appears undisputed that the selective incorporation theory has none.” (footnotes omitted)); Louis Henkin, 
“Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 77–78 (1963) (“There is no evidence, and 
it is difficult to conceive, that anyone thought or intended that the amendment should impose on the states 
a selective incorporation.”). 
11.  Disagreement in the face of ambiguous text is unsurprising. Interpretations of ambiguous texts 
necessarily rest on the interpreter’s values, see Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: 
A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 10 (2018) (noting that resort to principle is inevitable in the 
face of uncertainty); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57–
60 (1997) (discussing the role of value judgments in the formation of doctrine), and each individual has a 
personal hierarchy of values. 
12.  To be sure, the selective incorporation test protects state sovereignty to the extent it does not 
result in total incorporation, but it does not do so in a way that focuses on state sovereignty. It does not ask, 
for example, how incorporating a particular right would affect the states. 
13.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 784 (2010) (“Throughout the era of ‘selective incor-
poration,’ Justice Harlan in particular, invoking the values of federalism and state experimentation, fought a 
determined rearguard action to preserve the two-track approach. Time and again, however, those pleas 
failed.” (citations omitted)). 
14.  See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
15.  See infra notes 180–96 and accompanying text. 
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Accounting for the effect that incorporating a right would have on the 
states significantly changes the incorporation calculus.16 Not all provisions in 
the Bill of Rights equally impair state sovereignty if they are incorporated. Many 
provisions impose substantive limitations on the government—for example, 
the First Amendment limits the government’s ability to abridge the freedom of 
speech. Others require the government to observe particular procedures when 
taking actions—for example, the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement 
ordinarily to obtain warrants before conducting searches. Incorporating these 
provisions does undermine state sovereignty because those provisions restrict 
the areas in which the state may act and dictate the procedures a state must 
follow when taking some actions. 
The incorporation of other provisions, however, intrudes more signifi-
cantly on state sovereignty. Chief among those provisions are the Fifth Amend-
ment right to a grand jury, the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury, and 
the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury. These provisions do not simply 
create individual entitlements to have a jury instead of a judge decide particular 
issues; they dictate how a state must organize its government. They direct that a 
state can exercise certain of its government powers only through these juries. 
We call these provisions “structural rights.”17 
These structural rights are individual rights. They create entitlements in in-
dividuals to juries. But they also have structural features because they dictate 
which bodies of government can exercise particular powers. They accordingly 
operate much like the provisions in Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution 
that assign government powers to the various branches of the federal govern-
ment. 
Incorporating these structural rights deeply interferes with state sover-
eignty. One of the essential features of sovereignty is the ability to decide how 
to arrange a government and allocate power among its various bodies.18 How 
the people choose to arrange their government reflects the values and views of 
 
16.  Others have argued that federalism should limit incorporation, but they have offered different 
ways of operationalizing federalism in doctrine. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 10, at 935–36 (arguing that in-
corporated provisions should apply less rigorously to the states). 
17.  The way in which we use the term “structural rights”—individual rights that also entail allocations 
of government power—thus differs from the way in which Ozan Varol uses the term. Professor Varol uses 
the term to describe the concept that all rights confer government power. Ozan O. Varol, Structural Rights, 
105 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1012 (2017). A possible fourth structural right derives from the Fourth Amendment’s 
Warrant Clause, which provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although that Clause does not specifically assign the power to issue warrants, the 
Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that only a judge or magistrate may issue warrants. See Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Because the Court has not resolved the issue, this Article does not address 
it. 
18.  JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 132, at 73–74 (Thomas P. Peardon 
ed., The Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690). 
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the people, and it can have significant effect on the decisions that the govern-
ment makes. The Framers deliberately protected that power of the states. The 
only limitation they imposed is that states must have republican forms of gov-
ernment,19 but they deliberately left the states vast discretion in structuring their 
republican governments. As James Madison stated in The Federalist No. 45, the 
“powers reserved to the several States” under the Constitution included “the 
internal order . . . of the State.”20 
This Article argues that courts should not read the Fourteenth Amendment 
to incorporate these structural rights. Limiting incorporation in this way pro-
tects the state’s sovereign power to arrange its government. It also aligns with 
important federalism values. It allows states to serve as laboratories for experi-
mentation for different forms of government.21 And it helps the states perform 
their function of checking federal power.22 Not incorporating structural rights 
affords states broader discretion in diversifying their forms of government. 
These variations reduce the chance of all state governments being ineffectual 
checks on the federal government. 
Not incorporating structural rights also explains better the current state of 
the law. Although the prevailing view is that selective incorporation extends to 
the states the entirety of the Bill of Rights, the Court has not incorporated sev-
eral provisions, despite having multiple opportunities to do so.23 Most notably, 
the Court has refused to incorporate the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury 
and the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury.24 The selective incorporation 
test does not provide a sound explanation for the exclusion of those rights be-
cause those rights are no less fundamental or deeply rooted than other rights 
that the Court has incorporated. But the theory of not incorporating structural 
rights readily explains the refusal to incorporate those provisions because they 
contain structural rights. The theory also provides an explanation for anomalies 
in Sixth Amendment law. Despite insisting that incorporated rights apply 
equally to the states, courts have applied the right to a criminal jury differently 
 
19.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
20.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 262 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009). 
21.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing 
states as “laborator[ies]”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
489, 493 (1954) (“The federal system has the immense advantage of providing forty-eight separate centers 
for [legislative] experimentation.”). 
22.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 20, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that separate state 
governments provided a means to “check the usurpations” of the federal government). 
23.  The Court has never seriously entertained the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment incor-
porates the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Instead, it has simply assumed that only the first eight amend-
ments may be incorporated. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759–61 (2010) (referring to the 
first eight amendments as the “Bill of Rights” in discussing incorporation). 
24.  The Court has also not incorporated the Third Amendment. But that is because the Court has not 
had an occasion to do so; it has never heard any Third Amendment cases. Because the Third Amendment 
confers a substantive right, the Court would almost certainly incorporate it. Indeed, the only circuit court to 
consider the issue has held the right incorporated. See infra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
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to the states than to the federal government.25 The structural rights approach 
removes this anomaly by deincorporating the right. 
This theory of unincorporated structural rights takes no position on 
whether other rights in the Bill of Rights should be incorporated. It argues only 
that structural rights should be excluded from incorporation. It is thus a theory 
of exclusion, not inclusion.26 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the current theory of 
incorporation and identifies several shortcomings in the doctrine. Part II turns 
to developing the theory of structural rights. It explains that most provisions in 
the Constitution either allocate powers to government branches or protect 
rights of individuals. It argues that structural rights are an exception to this usual 
divide: they create entitlements in individuals to have particular government 
institutions make certain decisions, and at the same time, they empower those 
institutions to act. Part II then identifies the three structural rights in the text 
of the Bill of Rights: the right to a grand jury, the right to a jury in criminal 
cases, and the right to a jury in civil cases. 
Part III argues against incorporation of structural rights. It explains that 
control over the organization of government is a core feature of state sover-
eignty deeply embedded in the Constitution. It then explains that nothing in the 
language or history of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a basis for ignoring 
this principle and requiring states to adopt jury structures. It further argues that 
not incorporating structural rights makes better sense of the decisions not in-
corporating grand juries and civil juries and explains why the right to a criminal 
jury applies differently to the states. 
Part IV discusses the ramifications of not incorporating structural rights. 
Some of those consequences—such as maintaining the states’ discretion to de-
sign systems for deciding civil cases and for charging crimes—are obvious. Oth-
ers are less obvious but not less important. Perhaps the most significant 
consequence is that it would make Apprendi v. New Jersey,27 which holds that the 
Sixth Amendment prohibits judges from making factual findings that are nec-
essary to increasing the punishment range that an offender faces, inapplicable 
to the states. Apprendi rendered unlawful many state systems that authorized 
judges to make factual findings altering the range of punishment. Deincorpo-
rating the jury trial right on which Apprendi rests would allow states to reinstitute 
those sentencing schemes. 
 
25.  See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
26.  For another article discussing alternate theories of exclusion, see Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: 
The Bill of Rights After McDonald v. City of Chicago, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 159, 180–82 (2012) (articulating 
several possible theories after McDonald, including a theory that nonincorporated rights are not fundamental, 
a theory of stare decisis, total incorporation, and a jury theory of nonincorporation). 
27.  530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
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I. THE SELECTIVE INCORPORATION TEST 
The incorporation doctrine is important because the Bill of Rights does not 
apply by its own terms to the states. In the 1833 decision Barron v. City of Balti-
more,28 the Court held that the Bill of Rights applied only against the federal 
government.29 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall stated that the Con-
stitution was not “ordained and established . . . for the government of the indi-
vidual states,”30 and likewise, the adoption of the Bill of Rights “contain[ed] no 
expression indicating an intention to apply [the amendments] to the state gov-
ernments.”31 
But the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 sparked a new 
debate about the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states—a debate that 
continues today. That debate has focused on two clauses in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The first is the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which declares, 
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.”32 The second is the Due Process 
Clause, which states: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”33 
The text of neither clause obviously extends the Bill of Rights against the 
states. Although the Privileges or Immunities Clause prohibits states from 
abridging privileges or immunities, it does not define those privileges or im-
munities.34 Key sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment indicated that the pro-
vision meant to encompass the first eight amendments.35 But that 
understanding was not uniform among the members of Congress considering 
the Amendment.36 Moreover, the same terms “privileges” and “immunities” 
appear in Article IV of the Constitution,37 and earlier court decisions defined 
those terms to encompass a small category of rights different from those in the 
Bill of Rights.38 Less than five years after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifi-
 
28.  32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
29.  Id. at 250. 
30.  Id. at 247. 
31.  Id. at 250. 
32.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
33.  Id. 
34.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758 (2010) (acknowledging that even those who 
disagree with the Slaughter-House opinion do not agree on what rights the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
actually covers). 
35.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 157 (2012). 
36.  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3041 (1866) (recounting statement of Senator 
Reverdy Johnson of Maryland that he did “not understand what [would] be the effect of” the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause). 
37.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
38.  See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (“[C]onfining” the 
privileges and immunities of Article IV to “[p]rotection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, 
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cation, the Court adopted that latter interpretation in interpreting the Amend-
ment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.39 Consequently, the Court has held that 
the privileges and immunities in the Clause did not include the rights enumer-
ated in the Bill of Rights.40 Despite facing criticism,41 the decision continues to 
be good law.42 
The Due Process Clause is even more obscure.43 Although the Clause re-
quires states to provide some sort of procedures prescribed by law in depriving 
a person of life, liberty, or property, it does not specify precisely which proce-
dures must be followed. But unlike with the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
the Court has held that the Due Process Clause does incorporate provisions of 
the Bill of Rights against the states.44 The vague language of the term “due pro-
cess,” however, has resulted in significant disagreement about the extent to 
which the Clause incorporates the Bill of Rights. Some Justices, most notably 
Justice Black, have argued for complete incorporation of all of the provisions 
of the Bill of Rights.45 Others have been significantly more hostile to the idea 
that the Due Process Clause requires states to observe the Bill of Rights.46 
 
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; 
subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the 
whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of 
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to 
institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, 
either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens 
of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are 
clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, 
the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be 
exercised.”); see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (applying this definition to the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
39.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 75 (“There can be but little question that the purpose of 
both these provisions is the same, and that the privileges and immunities intended are the same . . . .”). 
40.  United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876). 
41.  The decision in Slaughter-House interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause so narrowly that it 
effectively rendered the Clause useless. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). 
42.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758 (2010). 
43.  Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99–100 (1908) (“Few phrases of the law are so elusive of exact 
apprehension as [due process of law].”). 
44.  See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 763. 
45.  Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (“To hold that this Court can 
determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is to frustrate 
the great design of a written Constitution.”). Nine Justices other than Justice Black have also supported this 
view. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1964) (noting that ten justices have supported total incorpora-
tion). The theory rests primarily on several statements from the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment suggesting that a major purpose of the Amendment was to ensure that the Bill of Rights was enforced 
against the states. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71–75 (Black, J., dissenting) (attaching a history that, in Justice 
Black’s view, “conclusively demonstrates that the language of the first section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment” was explicitly intended to apply the Bill of Rights guarantees against the states). 
46.  See, e.g., Twining, 211 U.S. at 98 (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not extend the 
Bill of Rights against the states). 
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Since the 1960s, the Court has taken an intermediate position of “selective 
incorporation.”47 Instead of concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment auto-
matically incorporates the entire Bill of Rights, the Court has held that whether 
a right is incorporated rests on a right-specific determination. A right applies 
against the states if it is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty”48 or is 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”49 
Although selective incorporation was adopted as an alternative to the total 
incorporation theory, the Court has suggested more recently that it extends all 
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states. Through the doctrine, 
the Court has incorporated “almost all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.”50 
The few provisions that are not incorporated are the Third Amendment right 
against quartering soldiers, the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury, and the 
Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury.51 The Court has sought to justify the 
failure to incorporate the Third Amendment on the ground that the Court has 
not had an opportunity to determine whether the provision is incorporated, and 
the failure to incorporate the grand and civil jury rights on the ground that ear-
lier decisions refusing to incorporate them predate the era of selective incorpo-
ration.52 The former is accurate, but as described below, the latter is not. 
Under the theory of selective incorporation, a right incorporated against 
the states affords the same level of protection against the states as it does against 
the federal government.53 According to the Court, it would simply be “incon-
gruous” to apply different standards in protecting incorporated rights against 
the states and federal government.54 Thus, as the Court has put it, it has “deci-
sively held” that once a right is incorporated it applies to the states and federal 
 
47.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 763. 
48.  Id. at 764 (emphasis omitted). 
49.  Id. at 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
50.  Id. at 764. 
51.  See id. at 764 n.13. Although it has never held that the Excessive Bail Clause applies against the 
states, the Court has stated in dicta that it does. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (“Bail, of 
course, is basic to our system of law, and the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of excessive bail has been 
assumed to have application to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citations omitted)); see also 
Scott W. Howe, The Implications of Incorporating the Eighth Amendment Prohibition on Excessive Bail, 43 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1039, 1085 (2015) (discussing the assumption that the Eighth Amendment applies to the states). 
52.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 n.13. 
53.  See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964) (“The Court thus has rejected the notion that the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a ‘watered-down, subjective version of the individual guar-
antees of the Bill of Rights.’” (quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960))). Instead, the 
Court decisively held that incorporated Bill of Rights protections “are all to be enforced against the States 
under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against 
federal encroachment.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 (quoting Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10); see also Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court “has simply assumed that the 
question . . . is whether . . . [a provision] should be incorporated into the Fourteenth [Amendment], jot-for-
jot and case-for-case, or ignored”). 
54.  Malloy, 378 U.S. at 11 (stating that it would be “incongruous” to apply different standards “de-
pending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court”). 
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government “according to the same standards.”55 Incorporation therefore re-
quires states not only to honor incorporated provisions but also to follow the 
various judicial doctrines implementing those provisions.56 
Despite being accepted by the Court for over fifty years, the selective in-
corporation doctrine has several major shortcomings. To start, the doctrine 
does not have any support in either the text or legislative history.57 Nor has the 
Court offered any theoretical justification for it. Instead, as Judge Friendly ob-
served, the doctrine is the product of cobbling together quotations from state-
ments in older decisions that did not mean to establish a doctrine of 
incorporation.58 
Second, the doctrine has a singular focus on the importance of the rights 
to individuals. It does not account for the effect that incorporation might have 
on the states; the Court has explicitly rejected the argument that federalism 
should have any bearing on incorporation.59 But under our federalist system, 
states are empowered to choose what behavior to regulate and the way in which 
to regulate it.60 They also have the autonomy to fashion and regulate their own 
governmental systems, including those in their judicial branches.61 Each incor-
porated right limits the scope of this state power. The degree of intrusion on 
the state is not limited to requiring the states to observe the incorporated rights. 
States are also obliged to follow all the doctrines that the Court has fashioned 
to implement those rights—doctrines that plainly go beyond what is seemingly 
required by the text.62 The consequence is that the Court regulates areas that 
would otherwise fall within state control. 
 
55.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765. 
56.  See Friendly, supra note 10, at 935 (stating that an incorporated right “comes over to the states with 
all the overlays the Court has developed in applying it to the Federal Government”). 
57.  See Henkin, supra note 10, at 77–78 (“There is no evidence, and it is difficult to conceive, that 
anyone thought or intended that the amendment should impose on the states a selective incorporation.”). 
58.  Friendly, supra note 10, at 934 (“The theory takes off from judicial statements that certain provi-
sions of the first eight amendments, especially the first, had been ‘absorbed’ in or ‘made applicable’ by the 
due process clause of the fourteenth—elliptical language quite obviously used as shorthand for earlier more 
careful delineations.” (footnotes omitted)). 
59.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 783. The Court further highlighted its rejection of the “two-track approach” 
under which the guarantees were applied differently against the state and federal governments in order to 
allow more flexibility for the states. Id. at 784. 
60.  United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 153 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Constitution 
delegates limited powers to the National Government and then reserves the remainder for the States . . . . 
And the powers reserved to the States are so broad that they remain undefined. Residual power, sometimes 
referred to (perhaps imperfectly) as the police power, belongs to the States and the States alone.”). 
61.  This power, like others, is not absolute. The important point, however, is that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, under which the Bill of Rights is incorporated, does not explicitly limit this power. Thus, it 
should not be read to ignore state sovereignty. Indeed, as explained above, many constitutional provisions 
are actually read in the opposite direction. In other words, they are read to contain implicit exceptions that 
avoid infringing on state sovereignty. 
62.  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 (2000) (concluding that, although it goes beyond 
the text of the Fifth Amendment, the Miranda doctrine is “constitutionally based”); Henry P. Monaghan, 
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1975) (developing a theory that constitutional 
doctrine goes beyond the text). 
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Third, despite the Court’s claims to the contrary, the selective incorporation 
test has not resulted in wholesale incorporation. It is true that the Court has not 
had an opportunity to determine whether to incorporate the Third Amend-
ment. No reported case in the Supreme Court raises an argument that the Third 
Amendment should be incorporated,63 and the one circuit case on the issue held 
that the right is incorporated.64 
But the Court’s explanation for the refusal to incorporate the grand and 
civil jury rights65—that the decisions refusing to incorporate those rights pre-
date selective incorporation—does not ring true. The Court has had the occa-
sion to consider the incorporation of both rights, and it has explicitly refused 
to do so as late as the 1970s, well after the Court adopted the current test for 
incorporation,66 and it continues to deny petitions for certiorari seeking recon-
sideration of the issues.67 
It is hard to say that these rights are less fundamental to our scheme of 
ordered liberty or rooted in our history than other provisions in the Bill of 
Rights. In 1681, the future Lord Chancellor wrote, “[G]rand juries are our only 
security, inasmuch as our lives cannot be drawn into jeopardy by all the mali-
cious crafts of the devil, unless such a number of our honest countrymen shall 
be satisfied in the truth of the accusations.”68 The perceived importance of the 
grand jury only increased in the American colonies because of their refusal to 
 
63.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 n.13 (“We never have decided whether the Third Amendment or the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive fines applies to the States through the Due Process Clause.”). 
64.  Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982). 
65.  In addition to not incorporating the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, the Court has also 
not incorporated the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment, which provides that “no fact tried 
by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The nonincorporation of this clause is a consequence of not incor-
porating the right to a jury. The right to a jury is a prerequisite to the right against second-guessing jury 
determinations. 
66.  See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431 (1996) (operating on the assumption 
that the Seventh Amendment jury trial right does not apply against the states); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103, 118–19 (1975) (reaffirming nonincorporation of the right to a grand jury); see generally Michael J. Quinlan, 
Is There a Neutral Justification for Refusing to Implement the Second Amendment or Is the Supreme Court Just “Gun Shy”?, 
22 CAP. U. L. REV. 641, 671 (1993) (discussing the Court’s adherence to nonincorporation of the rights to 
grand and civil juries). 
67.  See, e.g., Recreational Data Servs., Inc. v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1272 (2018) (mem.), 
denying cert. to 404 P.3d 120 (Alaska 2017) (seeking review of Seventh Amendment incorporation question); 
Hye v. Mississippi, 136 S. Ct. 267 (2015) (mem.), denying cert. to 131 So. 3d 577 (Miss. 2014) (seeking review 
of grand jury incorporation issue). 
68.  JOHN SOMERS, THE SECURITY OF ENGLISHMEN’S LIVES: OR, THE TRUST, POWER, AND DUTY OF 
GRAND JURIES OF ENGLAND 17 (Dublin, Sarah Cotter 1766); see also HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, 
OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT’S INHERITANCE 207 (Boston, J. Franklin 1721) (“To preserve the Innocent 
from the Disgrace and Hazards which ill Men may design to bring them . . . .”). 
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issue unwarranted indictments sought by the Crown.69 At the time of the rati-
fication of the Constitution, all states guaranteed the right to a grand jury,70 and 
all but a handful of states still had similar guarantees by the time of the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.71 
Civil juries were also common features in the colonies and early states. In 
1791, twelve of thirteen states guaranteed the right to a civil jury.72 The absence 
of a guarantee for juries in civil cases tried by federal courts generated some of 
the most heated criticism of the proposed Constitution.73 Thirty-six of the 
thirty-seven states in the Union in 1868—when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was adopted—guaranteed a right to civil jury trial.74 Today, all states but Loui-
siana guarantee the right to jury trials in at least some civil cases.75 
The Court has also not universally adhered to its rule that incorporated 
rights apply jot-for-jot against the states. Despite claiming that the states should 
not be subject to “only a watered-down, subjective version” of the guarantees,76 
the Court has allowed certain incorporated rights to apply differently to the 
federal government than to state governments. For example, the Court has long 
held that the Sixth Amendment requires jury verdicts to be unanimous in fed-
eral court,77 but it has said that this restriction does not apply to state criminal 
juries.78 
 
69.  4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 15.1, at 423; see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) 
(“Historically, this body has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and 
oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and 
the accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is 
founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.”). 
70.  4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 15.1(c), at 449 (“[A]ll of the original states had their own laws 
giving defendants a right to insist upon a grand jury charge when being prosecuted for a serious offense.”). 
71.  See Donald Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and the (First) Criminal Procedure Revo-
lution, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 469, 477–79 (2009). 
72.  Steven G. Calabresi et al., State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights Are Really Deeply 
Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1512 (2012) (“[I]n 1791 the number of states 
guaranteeing the right to a jury in a civil trial rose from ten to an impressive twelve . . . .”). 
73. See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 295 
(1966) (“The almost complete lack of any bill of rights was a principal part of the Anti-Federalist argument 
[against ratification]; the lack of provision for civil juries was a prominent part of this argument . . . .”). 
74.  Steven G. Calabresi et al., Individual Rights Under State Constitutions in 2018: What Rights Are Deeply 
Rooted in a Modern-Day Consensus of the States?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 49, 115 (2018). 
75.  Id. 
76.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 (2010). 
77.  See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900). 
78.  See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 766 n.14 (explaining how the Court reached this result). The Court has 
decided to revisit the incorporation of the unanimity requirement this term. State v. Ramos, 231 So. 3d 44 
(La. Ct. App. 2017), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (No. 18-5924). The unanimity requirement is not the 
only aspect of the Sixth Amendment jury right not extended to the states. But the Court has also not applied 
the vicinage requirement to state juries. See 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.6(b), at 831. Moreover, the 
discomfort with dictating how states arrange their juries resulted in the Court abandoning the requirement 
that juries consist of twelve people to uphold New York’s six-person jury. See generally Baldwin v. New York, 
399 U.S. 66 (1970). Although the change applies to both federal and state juries, Justice Harlan explained that 
the reason for the change was to allow the states “elbow room in ordering their own criminal systems.” Id. at 
118 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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II. STRUCTURAL RIGHTS 
Developing a theory of excluding structural rights from incorporation re-
quires first laying a groundwork about rights and structures. To that end, this 
Part develops two concepts. First, it distinguishes rights conferred by the Con-
stitution and structures established by the Constitution. Broadly speaking, both 
types of provisions aim to protect individual liberty. To do so, rights-conferring 
provisions limit the ability of the government to act in certain areas or prescribe 
procedures through which the government must act. Structural provisions, on 
the other hand, establish specific governmental institutions and assign powers 
to those institutions. Structural provisions protect individual liberty by diffusing 
power among the branches and levels of government, which prevents undue 
concentration of power in the hands of one institution or the federal or state 
government. 
Second, this Part defines and describes structural rights. These are a sort of 
hybrid between rights-conferring and structural provisions. They create indi-
vidual entitlements, but they also allocate government power to a particular in-
stitution. Structural rights permit the government to act, but only through 
certain bodies. The three structural rights in the Bill of Rights are the Fifth 
Amendment right to a grand jury, the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury, 
and the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury.79 
A. Rights Versus Structures 
The Constitution contains two general types of provisions. The first con-
fers rights; the second establishes government structures and assigns powers to 
those structures. Some rights in the Constitution limit the ability of the govern-
ment to act in a specific area. The First Amendment, for example, prohibits the 
government from abridging the freedom of speech.80 It marks speech as a re-
stricted area that the government cannot freely regulate, guaranteeing to the 
people the right to freedom of speech. Other examples of rights-conferring 
provisions include the Fourth Amendment’s restriction on unreasonable 
searches and seizures,81 the Second Amendment’s recognition of the right to 
bear arms,82 and the Third Amendment’s prohibition on quartered soldiers in 
time of peace.83 
Other rights entitle individuals to procedural protections. These rights do 
not prohibit the government from taking particular actions against individuals; 
 
79.  See supra note 17. 
80.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
81.  Id. amend. IV. 
82.  Id. amend. II. 
83.  Id. amend. III. 
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instead, they prescribe procedures that the government must follow before they 
take those actions. For example, the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the 
Court, requires the government ordinarily to obtain a warrant before conduct-
ing a search of a house,84 and the Sixth Amendment requires the government 
to permit criminal defendants to confront witnesses, to subpoena witnesses, 
and to obtain the assistance of counsel.85 Other examples include the right to 
due process86 and the right to a speedy criminal trial.87 
These rights-conferring provisions, however, are the exception, not the 
rule. Most provisions in the Constitution are structural: provisions that assign 
powers to various government institutions and dictate the procedures that those 
institutions must follow to exercise that power. For example, the majority of 
Article I is devoted to assigning legislative power to Congress,88 outlining how 
Congress shall be established,89 enumerating the areas in which Congress may 
legislate,90 and prescribing the procedures that Congress must follow to enact 
laws.91 Article II is similarly devoted to defining and assigning executive 
power,92 and Article III establishes and assigns federal judicial power.93 
Although it is commonly accepted that some provisions confer rights and 
others impose structures, the language of the Constitution does not always cre-
ate a clear demarcation between structure and rights. For example, although it 
is understood to confer rights, the First Amendment speaks in terms of limiting 
government power, providing that “Congress shall make no law” limiting 
speech.94 But history indicates that the Framers did distinguish between the 
structural and rights provisions in the Constitution.95 For example, in The Fed-
eralist No. 51, Madison explained that the Constitution did not simply confer 
rights but also allocated powers between both the states and federal govern-
ment and among the various branches of the federal government.96 Alexander 
Hamilton expressed a similar view when he listed the few provisions in the 
 
84.  Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016) (“[T]his Court has inferred that a warrant 
must [usually] be secured.” (alteration in original) (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011))). 
85.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
86.  Id. amend. V. 
87.  Id. amend. VI. 
88.  Id. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States . . . .”). 
89.  Id. §§ 2–5. 
90.  Id. § 8. 
91.  Id. §§ 6–7. 
92.  Id. art. II (defining and assigning the “executive Power . . . of the United States”). 
93.  Id. art. III (assigning and defining the “judicial Power of the United States”). 
94.  Id. amend. I. 
95.  Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1449 (2013) (“[T]here is 
reason to think that the Framers did indeed distinguish individual rights from structure.”). 
96.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 20, at 293–97 (James Madison). 
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original Constitution that he understood to confer individual rights and con-
trasted them with the other provisions that he understood to define govern-
ment powers.97 
Despite the distinction between the two types of provisions, both types of 
provisions limit the government’s ability to act. Moreover, they share the over-
arching goal of protecting individual liberty by constraining government power. 
Rights protect liberty directly by creating individual entitlements limiting the 
types of actions the government may take. Structural provisions protect liberty 
more indirectly. They do not confer on individuals a personalized entitlement 
to the observance of these structures.98 Instead, these structures protect liberties 
by distributing power among government institutions.99 As Madison explained, 
the structural arrangements established by the Constitution provide “secu-
rity . . . to the rights of the people.”100 
Some structural provisions achieve this goal through separation of powers. 
For example, by separating the legislative and executive powers, the Constitu-
tion prevents one institution from determining both what is illegal and who 
should be prosecuted. This arrangement prevents concentrating undue power 
in the hands of one institution.101 Other structural features limit government 
power by restricting the ability of one government institution to act without the 
acquiescence of another government institution. For example, the bicameralism 
provision requires both the House and the Senate to approve a bill before it can 
 
97.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 20, at 495–96 (Alexander Hamilton) (listing as among these 
individual rights the limits on the consequences of impeachment, the right to habeas corpus, the right against 
bills of attainder and ex-post-facto laws, the prohibition on titles of nobility, the right to criminal juries, the 
right against broadly defined treason, and the right against corruption of blood); see also GORDON S. WOOD, 
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 540 (1969) (noting James Wilson’s statement 
that “[i]t would be very extraordinary to have a bill of rights, because the powers of Congress are expressly 
defined”). 
98.  See Huq, supra note 95, at 1452 (“[T]here is little reason to think that the Constitution’s structural 
provisions, properly glossed, engender individual entitlements in the same way as the First Amendment or 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.”); see also F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers 
Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. REV. 673, 687–89 (2017) (exploring the distinction between individual rights and 
provisions bearing on government organization). Of course, although these structural provisions do not con-
fer rights on individuals, individuals can enforce these provisions when they otherwise have standing. See 
Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 217 (2011). 
99.  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (“The declared purpose of separating and dividing the 
powers of government, of course, was . . . ‘to secure liberty.’”(quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 20, at 450 
(Alexander Hamilton) (“For I agree that ‘there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from 
the legislative and executive powers.’” (quoting, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 152 (Thomas 
Nugent trans., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1949) (1748))). 
100.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 20, at 295 (James Madison); see Ernest A. Young & Erin C. 
Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United States v. Windsor, 2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 117, 144 (2012-
2013) (discussing Madison’s structural arguments). 
101.  Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 721 (stating that “separating and dividing the powers of government . . . ‘dif-
fus[es] power’” (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring))). 
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become a law.102 Likewise, the Presentment Clause requires Congress to present 
the bill to the President for signature before it becomes law,103 and if the Pres-
ident vetoes the law, it may become law only if both houses repass the bill by 
two-thirds votes.104 Together, the separation of powers and these checks and 
balances raise substantial obstacles to the government’s ability to act. 
B. Structural Rights 
Despite the tendency to divide the Constitution into structural and rights-
conferring provisions, the line between the two is not always absolute. Some 
provisions are hybrids. Falling into this camp are provisions that confer indi-
vidual rights to have one institution of government instead of another decide 
an issue. We call these provisions “structural rights.” Like other rights, these 
structural rights confer entitlements on individuals. But they also have structural 
aspects. They permit the government to act, but only through certain bodies. 
They thus function like rights with power-allocating provisions, dictating which 
government bodies have the power to act. 
Structural rights are different from the other substantive and procedural 
rights found in the Bill of Rights. They do not limit the areas in which the gov-
ernment may act. Nor do they simply prescribe the procedures that government 
institutions must follow. Structural rights allocate government power. They dic-
tate which government institutions hold what power. And like structural provi-
sions in the Constitution, the motivation behind these structural rights is to 
disperse power and check other branches of the government. 
Structural rights are rare in the Constitution. Most rights in the Constitution 
are either substantive or procedural.105 The first eight amendments—the body 
that the Court has said is incorporated—contain only three structural rights. 
They are the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury,106 the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury in criminal cases,107 and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury 
 
102.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring “[e]very Bill” to “have passed the House of Representatives 
and the Senate . . . before it become[s] a Law”). 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. 
105.  See supra text accompanying notes 80–87. Of course, although many rights are in the Bill of Rights, 
other provisions of the Constitution also confer rights. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of 
Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”). 
106.  U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”). 
107.  Id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”). 
The Sixth Amendment is not the only provision establishing a role for juries in criminal cases. Article III 
provides that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.” Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 
3. This Article III provision, however, applies only to federal prosecutions. Id. 
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in civil cases.108 These rights assign the power to adjudicate to grand and petit 
juries instead of judges, and they confer an individual right to have those insti-
tutions determine whether they should be indicted,109 convicted of a crime,110 
or adjudged to be liable in a common law case.111 
By dictating which bodies may exercise judicial power, each of these provi-
sions assigns government power.112 Other provisions in the first eight amend-
ments do not.113 To be sure, the right to counsel does require the government 
to appoint attorneys for criminal defendants. But providing counsel does not 
allocate the government’s power to act because defense attorneys do not exercise 
government power. The right to counsel therefore is not a structural right.114 
 
108.  Id. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”). 
109.  The Fifth Amendment requires a grand jury to indict individuals charged with capital or infamous 
crimes. Id. amend. V. The Supreme Court has held that infamous crimes include felonies. The Court has 
suggested, but not held, that a crime may be infamous even if it does not carry the punishment of a felony. 
See generally 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 15.1(b), at 439–41. For noninfamous crimes, a prosecutor may 
proceed by a preliminary hearing, in which the prosecutor seeks to persuade a judge, as opposed to a grand 
jury, that there is a sufficient basis for charging the defendant. 
110.  Although the text states that the right applies to “all” criminal cases, the Supreme Court has held 
that it does not extend to crimes carrying a penalty of only six months of imprisonment. Baldwin v. New 
York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970). 
111.  This right is also not absolute. It applies only for disputes that exceed $20 and only if the suit is 
of the sort that would have been resolved by a jury at the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment 
in 1791. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (citing Balt. & Carolina Line, 
Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935)). 
112.  According to Professor Amar, these jury provisions were viewed more as “political” rights of the 
jurors at the founding and more as “civil” rights at Reconstruction. AMAR, supra note 5, at 271. That the shift 
in conception occurred without restructuring the jury further suggests that the jury has both structural and 
rights features. 
113.  The Ninth and Tenth Amendments may also be structural rights. The Ninth Amendment pro-
vides that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.” Id. amend. X. Arguably, these provisions confer a right on the people 
and states to self-government and, accordingly, have the structural feature of allocating government power. 
See KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 285 (2009) (“[T]he founders adopted 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in order to reserve the ‘right of each state to determine for itself its own 
political machinery and its own domestic policies.’” (quoting Hawk v. Smith, 126 N.E. 400, 403 (Ohio 1919))). 
114.  The overarching concern with incorporating structural rights is the allocation of power. It is true 
that incorporating structural rights also requires the states to devote significant resources to funding juries. 
These forced expenditures, however, do not distinguish structural rights from other types of rights. The 
incorporation of many other rights results in state expenditures. Obvious examples include the costs borne 
by providing counsel to indigent defendants and facilitating compulsory process. The important difference 
between structural rights and other rights is that incorporating structural rights divests the states of the power 
to make determinations of how to organize their governments and distribute their sovereign powers. 
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1. The Fifth Amendment Right to a Grand Jury 
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be held to answer 
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a Grand Jury.”115 Grand juries are bodies of twelve to twenty-three 
individuals who have the power to investigate and charge crimes. To indict an 
individual, the grand jury must find probable cause to believe that the individual 
committed a capital or infamous crime.116 For less serious offenses, a prosecu-
tor may proceed by a preliminary hearing in which the prosecutor seeks to per-
suade a judge, as opposed to a grand jury, that there is a sufficient basis for 
charging the defendant.117 
The Grand Jury Clause creates a structural right. It confers a right not to 
be charged with a significant crime except by a grand jury. At the same time, it 
allocates to grand juries the power of indictment for federal offenses. Indeed, 
the principal benefit of the right to grand juries consists of the structural limi-
tations it imposes on the government. Allocating indictment power to the grand 
jury creates a check on prosecutorial overreach: a grand jury can refuse to indict 
a person if it believes the prosecution is unwarranted.118 It also acts as a check 
on Congress because the grand jury may refuse to indict if they believe the law 
alleged to have been violated is unjust or unconstitutional.119 Further, it limits 
the power of judges. Judges are employees of the government, and thus, they 
may simply be more inclined to support the government in criminal cases.120 
Moreover, despite Article III’s salary and job guarantees aimed at making judges 
independent, that independence is not complete. The judiciary depends on 
Congress for funding, and accordingly they may rule to please members of Con-
gress even when the evidence does not support their conclusion. Likewise, 
judges aspiring for appointments by the President to higher positions may be 
inclined to support the prosecution. 
 
115.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Amendment contains an exception for military cases. 
116.  According to the Court, infamous crimes include felonies. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 
354 (1886). And it may include other misdemeanors that carry a sufficiently stigmatizing punishment. See 4 
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 15.1(b), at 439–41; see generally Gabriel J. Chin & John Ormonde, Infamous 
Misdemeanors and the Grand Jury Clause, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1911 (2018) (discussing what constitutes infamous 
crimes). Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a grand jury indictment is required only for felonies. 
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7. A misdemeanor can be tried on an information. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(b). The 
conclusion must be that punishment of less than one year is not infamous. 
117.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a)(4). 
118.  Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries and the Rise of the 
Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 1231 (2014). 
119.  Id. 
120.  Id. at 1212–14 (detailing the importance of the grand jury being separate from the government). 
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2. The Sixth Amendment Right to a Criminal Jury 
The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”121 By its 
terms, this provision confers a “right” on individuals to trial by a jury in criminal 
cases. But it also allocates power to juries to hear and decide criminal cases. 
Because it both creates an entitlement to a jury and allocates power to the jury, 
the provision is a structural right.122 
Although the Amendment states that the right extends to “all” criminal 
cases, the Supreme Court has held that it applies only to those criminal charges 
that carry a punishment of more than six months.123 The Court, however, has 
extended the effect of the right beyond the criminal trial to criminal sentencing. 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment prohibits 
judges from making factual findings that are necessary to increasing the pun-
ishment range that an offender faces.124 Those determinations, the Court said, 
must be made by a jury. 
As with the grand jury guarantee in the Fifth Amendment, assigning the 
power to decide criminal cases to juries checks the three branches of govern-
ment. For the government to obtain a conviction against a person, it must con-
vince a jury of lay citizens that the conviction is proper. Criminal juries can 
acquit those whom they believe to be unjustly prosecuted, and they can refuse 
to convict under a law that they perceive to be unjust.125 And they may be more 
likely to do so than judges because, again, they do not have the same depend-
ence on the government as judges.126 
No less important than checking the government, the structural aspects of 
the jury rights foster civic development. Participation on a jury provides an op-
portunity for individuals to learn about the law, the legal system, and the types 
of problems that plague society.127 It also gives an opportunity for individuals 
 
121.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
122.  See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE 
L.J. 1672, 1683 (2012) (discussing the “connection” between the “individual-rights” to juries and “the sepa-
ration of powers”). 
123.  Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970). 
124.  530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
125.  Although the Court has criticized jury nullification, it has acknowledged that juries have the power 
to nullify. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 141 (1895). 
126.  Whether juries actually acquit more than judges is highly debatable. See Keith A. Findley, Reducing 
Error in the Criminal Justice System, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1265, 1279 (2018) (questioning conclusions about 
judges versus juries); Alexander Lundberg, Sentencing Discretion and Burdens of Proof, 46 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
34, 40 (2016) (pointing to data to question “the conventional wisdom that a defendant is better off going 
before an unpredictable jury” than a judge). 
127.  1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 364 (Francis Bowen ed., Henry Reeve 
trans., Sever & Francis 1862) (1835) (“The jury . . . serves to communicate the spirit of the judges to the 
minds of all the citizens; and this spirit, with the habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation for free 
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to participate in government. As Tocqueville put it, the jury system “places the 
real direction of society in the hands of the governed . . . and not in that of the 
government.”128 
3. The Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury 
The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved.”129 Similar to the Sixth Amendment, this provision, by its 
terms, confers a “right” on individuals to demand a jury to resolve common 
law claims. It also allocates government power: it empowers juries to decide 
common law cases exceeding $20. 
The scope of the amendment is limited, however. It does not create a right 
to a jury in all cases. The Amendment preserves the right of trial by jury only 
for the sorts of claims that a jury would have resolved in 1791.130 Thus, the 
Court has said, it entitles parties to juries to resolve common law and other legal 
actions whose historical counterparts were resolved by a jury, but it does not 
entitle parties to juries in equitable actions.131 
Like other structural rights, the civil jury provision aims to check the exer-
cise of government power.132 Civil juries historically played an important role 
in limiting executive power by potentially awarding damages against govern-
ment officials who violate rights.133 They also limit executive power by adjudi-
cating civil suits brought by the government against individuals. To be sure, this 
check on executive power is less pronounced than the check imposed by crim-
inal juries because, unlike in criminal suits, the executive is not a party to every 
civil suit.134 Moreover, the ability of civil juries to impose liability on govern-
ment officials has diminished because of qualified immunity. Nevertheless, the 
civil jury still has the potential to limit executive power. 
 
institutions. It imbues all classes with a respect for the thing judged, and with the notion of right.”); Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1186 (1991). 
128.  1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 127, at 361; see also Amar, supra note 127, at 1185 (noting Tocque-
ville’s observation that “the overall jury system was fundamentally populist and majoritarian”). 
129.  U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
130.  Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). 
131.  Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830) (stating that the Amendment confers a right 
to a jury in “suits in which legal rights [are] to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those 
where equitable rights alone [are] recognized, and equitable remedies [are] administered”). 
132.  Indeed, “[f]or many purposes until the nineteenth century the civil and criminal jury were insep-
arable.” John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY 
IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, 1700–1900, at 15 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed., 1987). 
133.  See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389–
98 (1971). 
134.  Blackstone noted that the criminal jury itself was more essential than the civil jury because of the 
possible influence of the executive on judges. See Thomas, supra note 118, at 1202. 
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Civil juries also check legislative power because they can refuse to enforce 
laws that they perceive to be unjust. They also limit the power of the judiciary. 
As Blackstone noted centuries ago, judges adjudicating civil cases may harbor 
“involuntary bias” in favor of parties of similar class and background as the 
judge.135 Because they contain a cross section of society, juries are less likely to 
have that bias.136 
As with criminal juries, the right to civil juries also provides an opportunity 
for the public to participate in the governance.137 As the Federal Farmer ex-
plained in criticizing the original Constitution for failing to include a right to 
civil juries, juries “secure to the people at large, their just and rightful controul 
[sic] in the judicial department.”138 Indeed, the Anti-Federalists viewed the ina-
bility of the people to participate in the federal government, because of the lack 
of a right to a civil jury in the original Constitution, as more distressing than the 
failure to protect individuals through a jury in particular cases.139 
III. A STRUCTURAL RIGHT THEORY OF NONINCORPORATION 
Two things should be clear from Parts I and II. First, selective incorpora-
tion is not grounded in the history or text of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
fails to consider adequately the effect of incorporation on the states. Second, 
not all rights in the Bill of Rights take the same form. Some provisions limit the 
substantive actions the government may take, others prescribe procedures the 
government must follow in taking those actions, and still others—structural 
rights—require the government to adopt and assign power to particular struc-
tures. 
 
135.  3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379. 
136.  The Constitution protects this role for the jury by prohibiting courts from reexamining facts 
determined by the jury, except to the extent permitted by the ancient common law. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
VII. 
137.  1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 127, at 364 (describing the virtues of “more especially the civil jury”); 
Amar, supra note 127, at 1186. 
138.  Letter from the Federal Farmer (XV) (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in RICHARD H. LEE, AN 
ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER 130, 138 (Quadrangle Books, Inc. 1962) 
(1788); see also 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 253 (AMS 1971) (1850) (reflecting that “the common people[] 
should have as complete a control” over the judiciary as over the legislature); Letters of Centinel (II) (Oct. 
24, 1787) in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 149 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (a jury trial “preserves 
in the hands of the people, that share which they ought to have in the administration of justice”); Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to L’Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 282, 283 
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) (“[I]t is necessary to introduce the people into every department of government . . . . 
Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary depart-
ment, I would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative.”). 
139.  See HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 19 (The Univ. of Chi. 
Press ed., 1981) (“The question was not fundamentally whether the lack of adequate provision for jury trial 
would weaken a traditional bulwark of individual rights (although that was also involved) but whether it would 
fatally weaken the role of the people in the administration of government.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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This Part argues against incorporation of structural rights. As it explains, 
the power to organize government is a core feature of sovereignty, and the 
principle of preserving the states’ ability to organize their governments is deeply 
embedded in our constitutional structure. The structural provisions in the Bill 
of Rights dictate the way that a state must structure its judiciary. Incorporating 
those structural rights interferes with the states’ prerogative to structure their 
governments. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment should be read not to 
incorporate structural rights against the states. This theory of not incorporating 
structural rights both justifies the Court’s refusal to incorporate the grand jury 
and civil jury rights and sheds light on the anomalies surrounding the incorpo-
ration of the criminal jury right. 
A. The Constitutional Principle of State Control of State Government 
The Constitution created the national government but not the states’ gov-
ernments.140 States were separate sovereigns that preexisted the Constitution,141 
and they continued to exist under the Constitution. Thus, one of the core prin-
ciples of the Constitution is dual sovereignty of the states and the United States. 
Under this framework, the states retained the sovereign power to arrange their 
own governments.142 
1. The Sovereign Power of Arranging Government 
An essential feature of sovereignty in a democratic society is the power to 
arrange government.143 This power belongs to the people who make up a sov-
ereign entity and includes the prerogative to choose which form of government 
to adopt and to distribute power among those bodies.144 The governmental 
structures that the people adopt reflect the values of those people. For example, 
people who value a government highly responsive to public sentiment may es-
tablish a government in which all offices are filled through annual elections. By 
contrast, people who more strongly value stability may prefer a government in 
which positions are filled for life. Similarly, people who value efficiency might 
prefer delegating significant power to one government institution, whereas peo-
ple who fear too much power in the hands of one institution might prefer di-
viding power among different branches of government. 
 
140.  Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868). 
141.  Id. 
142.  Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973) (noting that each state has the “constitutional 
responsibility for the establishment and operation of its own government”). 
143.  LOCKE, supra note 18, § 132, at 68. 
144.  Id. at 73 (“[T]he community may dispose of [power] into what hands they please . . . .”). 
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The different government structures can affect the way the government 
operates and the decisions it reaches.145 Consider the two houses of Congress. 
Members of the House of Representatives are chosen through biennial elec-
tions in hundreds of districts that are allotted based on population.146 Because 
the Representatives are up for reelection so frequently and each Representative 
is ultimately elected by a relatively small constituency, the House is more likely 
to act consistently with the current desires of a wide swath of the population.147 
By contrast, members of the Senate are chosen through statewide elections 
once every six years.148 The Senate, accordingly, is less susceptible to current 
national pressures and is more likely to consider policies with an eye toward 
longer-term goals. 
Different institutional structures within the government also lead to differ-
ent levels of expertise and access to information.149 For example, a standard 
justification for assigning policymaking to administrative agencies instead of 
leaving it to the courts is that agencies have better access to relevant information 
and more expertise in policymaking.150 Agencies have large staffs with special-
ized education, and they may conduct studies, gather data, and widely solicit 
public input to inform their determinations. On the other hand, courts must 
rely on the information that the parties present to them or that they find 
through their limited independent research. If society values thoroughly in-
formed policies, it makes sense to put policymaking authority in the hands of 
agencies that have the ability and expertise to make those decisions. 
These same types of considerations apply to allocating power within the 
judiciary. For example, those who highly value efficiency might prefer that 
judges handle all cases, while those concerned about leaving too much power 
in the hands of judges might prefer to assign more responsibilities to juries. 
Judges and juries also have different institutional advantages. For example, 
judges are educated in the law, and their experience may make them better 
equipped than jurors for some aspects of adjudication, such as weighing the 
evidence in a particular case and balancing the benefits of a decision against its 
costs. Further, because they are repeat adjudicators, judges may be in a better 
position to evaluate harms by comparing cases. 
 
145.  F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Non-Redelegation Doctrine, 55 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 163, 201 (2013) (“[T]ransferring the power to set policy to a different body changes the process for 
establishing a broad range of substantive policy.”). 
146.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
147.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 20, at 300 (James Madison) (“[I]t is particularly essential 
that the [House of Representatives] should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy 
with, the people.”). 
148.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
149.  See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 
1277, 1279 (2001) (discussing how institutional design affects expertise and information flow). 
150.  See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). 
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By contrast, juries are likely to be better than judges at reaching decisions 
that reflect the views of a broader cross section of the community,151 such as 
whether an alleged tortfeasor acted reasonably or unreasonably and how much 
to award for pain and suffering. But jurors are unlikely to be educated in the 
law, and they are unlikely to have prior experience in adjudications.152 Accord-
ingly, if society values a judgment that reflects the views of the community in a 
particular circumstance, it should prefer providing a jury in that instance. 
2.  The Constitution Preserves the State Power to Arrange State Government 
The Framers preserved in the Constitution the sovereign power of the 
states to arrange their own governments. Although the Constitution prescribed 
the allocation of power in the national government, it did not prescribe govern-
mental institutions that the states must adopt.153 Instead, it left that power to 
the states.154 As James Madison stated in The Federalist No. 45, the “powers re-
served to the several States” under the Constitution included “the internal or-
der . . . of the State.”155 
The only provision in the original Constitution bearing on the organization 
of state government is the Guarantee Clause in Article IV, which provides that 
the United States must “guarantee” to the states “a Republican Form of Gov-
ernment.”156 On its face, this Clause protects the state power to organize state 
 
151.  Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 
YALE L.J. 1775, 1775 (1999) (“The one task that juries indisputably perform better than judges is to reflect 
the ‘conscience of the community’ . . . .”). 
152.  Criticisms of this sort led to a push for the abolition of juries in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. See Andrew Kent, The Jury and Empire: The Insular Cases and the Anti-Jury Movement in the Gilded Age 
and Progressive Era, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 405 (2018). 
153.  Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (“The constitution was ordained and 
established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the 
government of the individual states.”); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549–
50 (1985) (“[T]he Constitution of the United States . . . recognizes and preserves the autonomy and inde-
pendence of the States—independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938))). 
154.  Mayor of Phila. v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 n.13 (1974) (“The Constitution does 
not impose on the States any particular plan for the distribution of governmental powers.”); see also Sweezy 
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (“[T]he concept of separation of powers embodied in the United 
States Constitution is not mandatory in state governments.”). 
155.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 20, at 262 (James Madison). 
156.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Although phrased in terms of a duty on Congress to guarantee a repub-
lican government in the states, the Clause has been understood to imply a duty on the part of the states 
themselves to provide such a government. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175 (1874). That 
reading corresponds with one of the major reasons for the Clause: the belief that maintaining a national 
republic depended on the states having republican governments. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) (noting Edmund Randolph’s statement of June 11, 
1787, that “a republican government must be the basis of our national union; and no state in it ought to have 
it in their power to change its government into a monarchy”); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 20, at 
245 (James Madison). But note that this was not the only reason for the Clause. Some argued that it was to 
require Congress to help the states to prevent tyranny. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 20, at 245 
(James Madison); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 47 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) 
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governments—so long as they are republican—by imposing an obligation on 
the United States to prevent efforts to displace state governments.157 At the 
same time, the Clause effectively imposes an obligation on the states to adopt 
a republican government—one in which the people “choose their own officers 
for governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue of the legis-
lative power reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said 
to be those of the people themselves.”158 But the Clause does not dictate the 
particular form of republican government that the states must adopt.159 It in-
stead leaves the precise form of republican government to the states.160 As Mad-
ison stated in The Federalist No. 43, “Whenever the States may choose to 
substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so . . . . The only re-
striction imposed on them is that they shall not exchange republican for anti-
republican Constitutions . . . .”161 
Confirming this conclusion is the variety of government arrangements in 
the states. For example, at its founding, Pennsylvania vested the legislative 
 
(noting James Wilson’s statement of July 18, 1787, that “[t]he object [of the Clause] is merely to secure the 
States agst. [sic] dangerous commotions, insurrections and rebellions”). 
157.  See Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 672 (2018) (concluding that 
the reason for the Clause was to “serve as a bulwark of state sovereignty against federal interference”). Pro-
fessor Williams goes even further, arguing that the reason for the Clause was to prohibit the United States 
from displacing state governments with federal ones. Id. 
158.  In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891). 
159.  Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 175 (1874) (“No particular government is designated as republican, 
neither is the exact form to be guaranteed, in any manner especially designated.”). 
160.  Id.; 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1811, 
at 681 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1833) (“Whenever the states may choose to substitute other republican forms, 
they have a right to do so . . . . The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange repub-
lican for anti-republican constitutions . . . .”). Aside from setting outer constraints on the states’ forms of 
government, the original Constitution places various substantive limits on state power. For example, Article 
I, Section Ten prohibits states from taking particular actions, such as enacting ex post facto laws. These 
substantive limitations, however, do not dictate how the state must arrange its government. 
161.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 20, at 246 (James Madison). Professor Amar has argued that 
the Guarantee Clause took on a new meaning following Reconstruction because the proponents of the Re-
construction Amendments relied on the Republican Form of Government Clause as a sword to coerce states 
into ratifying the Amendments. See AMAR, supra note 35, at 80–81. In his view, the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment effectively incorporated this new view of the Clause under which states no longer have 
the prerogative to arrange their governments. Id. But that argument has several faults. First, that the Clause 
was used in a new way to coerce acquiescence to the Fourteenth Amendment does not establish that the 
Clause was validly used, and it is highly contestable that we should read the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
does not speak in terms of government forms, as enshrining that new, invalid use. See Williams, supra note 
157, at 678–79 n.472 (criticizing Amar’s method of interpreting the Guarantee Clause). Moreover, the Re-
construction practice has not resulted in the view that states no longer have the power to organize their 
governments. States today still maintain a variety of different forms of government. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 162–74. In any event, the Reconstruction practice would not establish that the Republican Form of 
Government Clause stripped states of control over their governments; it shows only that Congress can opt 
not to recognize state governments. It therefore does not establish that the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
a sufficient basis to overcome the principle of preserving state sovereignty and to incorporate structural rights 
against the states. 
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power in a unicameral legislature and the executive power in an executive coun-
cil.162 New York provided for a council of revision, which consisted of the gov-
ernor, chancellor, and judges of the supreme court, that had authority “to revise 
all bills about to be passed into laws by the legislature.”163 Connecticut main-
tained its royal charter, which dispersed executive power among fourteen 
elected officials and assigned both the legislative and judicial power to a general 
assembly.164 The variety continues to this day. Although most states have bi-
cameral legislatures, Nebraska has a unicameral legislature.165 The executive ar-
rangements are even more varied,166 with the different states allocating 
executive power among a total of thirteen different offices.167 
State judiciaries are no less varied.168 Each state has adopted different juris-
dictional arrangements. They each have created their own structure of courts to 
handle torts, contracts, family matters, probate, and other matters.169 More gen-
erally, many states have merged law and equity in their courts, but others—such 
as Delaware, Mississippi, and Tennessee—have separate courts for law and eq-
uity.170 They have also varied in their appellate hierarchy. For example, Texas 
has two supreme courts. One handles criminal matters,171 and the other handles 
all other matters.172 Nine states do not have intermediate appellate courts.173 
And until 1845, Georgia did not have any appellate courts.174 
In addition to protecting a core feature of state sovereignty, leaving the 
design of state governments to the states aligns with the reasons for adopting a 
federal system in the first place. One frequently invoked benefit of federalism 
 
162.  PA. CONST. of 1776, §§ 2–3, 19. In 1790, Pennsylvania adopted a new constitution that estab-
lished a bicameral legislature and governor. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1. 
163.  N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. III. 
164.  CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT (1662), avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ct03.asp. 
165.  NEB. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
166.  State & Local Government, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-
house/state-local-government/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (“No two state executive organizations are identi-
cal.”). 
167.  State Executive Offices, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_executive_offices (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2019) (listing the different state offices). 
168.  Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1833, 1886–96 (2001) (providing examples of different state judicial structures). 
169.  See State Court Structure Charts, CT. STAT. PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/ 
State_Court_Structure_Charts.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (mapping all the state judicial structures). 
170.  DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. 6, § 152; TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 1. 
171.  TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5. 
172.  Id. § 3. 
173.  Intermediate Appellate Courts, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Intermediate_appellate_ 
courts (last visited Aug. 24, 2019). 
174.  The Supreme Court of Georgia History, SUP. CT. GA., https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/ 
history/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2019). Before that time, appeals in the state consisted of a new trial in the same 
local court. Id. 
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is that it allows states to act as laboratories to experiment with different ap-
proaches to handling problems.175 Preserving state control of their government 
structures allows states the flexibility to act this way because it provides an op-
portunity for states to experiment with different types of government.176 But 
requiring states to adopt the same government structures would undermine this 
benefit. It would stifle state innovation and experimentation that may otherwise 
lead to improved methods for administering the states.177 
A second reason for federalism is that dividing power between state and 
federal governments acts as a check on those governments.178 According to the 
Court, this checking function is the “principal benefit of the federalist sys-
tem.”179 Requiring states to adopt the same government structures imperils this 
function. The required government structure may turn out to be easily captured, 
to be too unwieldy, or to have some other defect that makes the states an inef-
fectual check on the federal government. Allowing states to diversify their 
forms of government reduces this risk. 
To effectuate this principle of leaving control of state government to the 
states, the Court has often taken pains to interpret broad constitutional provi-
sions in a way that avoids interfering with state sovereignty. An early example 
is Barron v. City of Baltimore.180 There, the plaintiff sued Baltimore for rendering 
its wharf unusable, claiming that he was entitled to damages under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.181 The Court rejected the claim.182 It explained 
that the Constitution was established for the government of the United States, 
“not for the government of the individual states,” and that, while the Constitu-
tion could restrict state power, the Court would not construe the Constitution 
to limit state sovereignty except when the Constitution does so by “express 
words,”183 which the Bill of Rights does not.184 
 
175.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing 
states as “laborator[ies]”); Hart, supra note 21, at 493 (“The federal system has the immense advantage of 
providing forty-eight separate centers for . . . [legislative] experimentation.”). 
176.  Preserving the ability of states to act as laboratories does not mean that states will, in fact, act as 
laboratories. See Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1119, 1137–46 (2018) (raising doubts about state experimentalism). Even so, preserving the ability to exper-
iment is valuable because it preserves the possibility of future experimentation. 
177.  See, e.g., Chapman & McConnell, supra note 122, at 1703–06 (discussing the importance of feder-
alism for innovation). 
178.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 20, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that separate state 
governments provided a means to “check the usurpations” of the federal government). 
179.  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
180.  32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
181.  Id. at 245–46. 
182.  Id. at 250–51. 
183.  Id. at 247–48. 
184.  The one proposed amendment in the original Bill of Rights that did explicitly regulate state gov-
ernments—an amendment that would have required states to try criminal cases by juries—failed to garner 
enough votes in Congress to be sent to the states. Although the House passed the amendment, the Senate 
did not. See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 215–19 (1957). 
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Following a similar rationale, the Court has often interpreted broad lan-
guage in constitutional provisions to include implicit exceptions to prevent in-
terference with the operation of state government. For example, Article IV 
authorizes Congress to admit new states.185 In the exercise of that power, Con-
gress can impose conditions on states for their admission.186 But in Coyle v. 
Smith,187 the Court held that Congress could not reserve to itself the power to 
dictate the location of Oklahoma’s capital in the future as a condition of admit-
ting Oklahoma as a state.188 The rationale was that once the nation admits a 
state, Congress cannot interfere with that state’s core sovereignty.189 Although 
it acknowledged that the text of the Clause does not explicitly prohibit Congress 
from imposing this condition, the Court explained that the power to locate the 
capital is one of the “essentially and peculiarly state powers” that cannot be 
controlled by Congress.190 How a state arranges its own republic form of gov-
ernment is no less essential or peculiar to the state. 
The Court has read similar restrictions into the Commerce Clause. The 
Clause authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States.”191 Nothing in the text of the Clause prohibits Congress from using the 
power to regulate the way in which states exercise government powers. But the 
Court has read an implicit exception of that sort into the Clause. For example, 
in New York v. United States,192 the Court held that Congress could not require 
state legislatures to adopt regulations relating to the disposal of radioactive 
waste, even though the disposal of waste is interstate commerce.193 The Court 
explained that the Commerce Clause “confers upon Congress the power to reg-
ulate individuals, not States.”194Accordingly, the Court stated, it does not au-
thorize “Congress to command a state government to enact state regulation.”195 
 
185.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
186.  Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 568 (1911) (“Congress may require, under penalty of denying ad-
mission, that the organic laws of a new State at the time of admission shall be such as to meet its approval.”); 
see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Let’s Mess with Texas, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1604 (2004) (dis-
cussing Congress’s power to condition consent to admission of states). 
187.  221 U.S. 559. 
188.  As the Court noted, the only possible restriction on this admission power is that no new state 
shall be formed within the jurisdiction of any other state. Id. at 566. 
189.  Id. at 565–66. 
190.  Id. at 565; see also Lane Cty. v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868) (holding that, even in the 
absence of explicit language protecting state taxation, Congress cannot use any of its powers to prohibit states 
from imposing taxes, reasoning that “the power of taxation is indispensable” to the existence of the states). 
191.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
192.  505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
193.  See id. at 159–60. 
194.  Id. at 166. 
195.  Id. at 178 (emphasis omitted); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“The 
Federal Government may [not] command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to ad-
minister or enforce a federal regulatory program.”). 
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In other words, the Court held that despite its unequivocal language, the Com-
merce Clause contains an implicit exception that bars Congress from using that 
power to force state governments to implement federal programs.196 
To be sure, the Court has concluded that the Constitution permits some 
limited intrusions on the state power to manage state government. In Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,197 for example, the Court held that the 
Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to impose minimum-wage require-
ments for state employees.198 But that decision did not overturn the principle 
against federal interference with the states’ power to arrange their governments. 
It is one thing for Congress to require that states pay a minimum wage to em-
ployees of existing state institutions. It is quite another for Congress to require 
the state to establish the institution in the first place. The former says only that 
the states must pay their employees enough; the latter dictates how the state 
must govern, and it is significantly more intrusive. The Garcia Court acknowl-
edged this point, recognizing that there may be “limits” on Congress’s power 
to arrange state government, and cited Coyle to suggest that Congress could not 
use its power to force states to relocate their capitals.199 
The upshot of these cases is that preserving state power to arrange govern-
ment is an important background principle of the Constitution. When reading 
constitutional provisions that use broad language, courts have concluded that 
these broad provisions contain implicit exceptions protecting the states’ power 
to organize their governments. 
Of course, the presumption is not absolute. Several constitutional provi-
sions explicitly restrict the way in which states may arrange their governments. 
For example, as noted earlier, the Guarantee Clause requires states to adopt 
 
196.  The Court has suggested similar exceptions for the Equal Protection Clause. In Sugarman v. 
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973), the Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause forbids states from 
imposing a blanket prohibition on hiring aliens in any state position. But in doing so, the Court suggested 
that states can discriminate against hiring aliens whenever they have any legitimate reason for doing so, in-
cluding the interest in administering state government. Id. (recognizing a legitimate state interest in prohibiting 
aliens from “holding state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for 
officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy perform 
functions that go to the heart of representative government”); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 126 
(1970) (“In interpreting what the Fourteenth Amendment means, the Equal Protection Clause should not be 
stretched to nullify the States’ powers over elections which they had before the Constitution was adopted 
and which they have retained throughout our history.”). 
197.  469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
198.  Garcia overturned National League of Cities v. Usery. Id. at 557. In Usery, the Court held that Congress 
could not use the commerce power to impose minimum wage requirements on state employees, stating that 
“[o]ne undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States’ power to determine the wages which shall be 
paid to those whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental functions.” Nat’l League of Cities, 
426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976). Although Garcia overturned Usery, it did not hold that Congress has plenary power 
to interfere with state government. 
199.  Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)) (“These cases do not require 
us to identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action 
affecting the States under the Commerce Clause.”). 
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republican forms of government.200 The Fifteenth Amendment also restricts 
the states’ administration of their governments by prohibiting states from lim-
iting the right to vote based on race.201 Similarly, the Nineteenth Amendment 
requires states to permit women to vote in state elections.202 But these express 
exceptions prove the rule.203 They suggest that except when the Constitution 
explicitly regulates the states’ power to arrange their governments, one should 
not read the Constitution to curtail that state power. 
B. Against Incorporating Structural Rights 
Structural rights should not be incorporated against the states because they 
interfere with the principle of preserving state control over state government. 
Although there is broad consensus that the Fourteenth Amendment extends 
some rights against the states, there is disagreement about which rights fall in 
this category. This disagreement derives from the failure of the text and legisla-
tive history of the Fourteenth Amendment to specify which rights the Amend-
ment does and does not apply against the states through incorporation. 
Accordingly, other principles must guide the determination whether to incor-
porate a right. One of those principles is that our Constitution establishes a 
system of dual government under which the states retain significant sovereignty, 
and a central feature of that sovereignty is a state’s prerogative to organize its 
government. Structural rights, accordingly, should not be incorporated.204 
1. Against Reading the Fourteenth Amendment to Incorporate Structural Rights 
Courts and commentators have cited two clauses to support incorporation: 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Due Process Clause. The text of 
neither Clause suggests that they were meant to displace the states’ power to 
arrange their governments. Neither Clause mentions the distribution of power 
within the state—much less directs the states to adopt particular government 
structures. Instead, both Clauses seek to protect individual rights. They prohibit 
states from depriving citizens of privileges or immunities and from depriving 
individuals of life, liberty, or property without due process. 
Highlighting that the aim of the Clauses is not to limit the states’ ability to 
arrange their governments is that other sections of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
200.  U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 4. 
201.  Id. amend. XV. 
202.  Id. amend. XIX. 
203.  See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125–26 (1970) (“Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen, Nineteen, 
and Twenty-four, each of which has assumed that the States had general supervisory power over state elec-
tions, are examples of express limitations on the power of the States to govern themselves.”). 
204.  See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 256 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that 
it would “make the deepest inroads upon our federal system for this Court [to] determine the appropriate 
distribution of powers and their delegation within the forty-eight States”). 
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do restrict that ability. Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment does in-
clude an explicit provision affecting the states’ ability to arrange their govern-
ment themselves. It prohibits individuals from holding state office if they rebel 
against the United States while holding a public office in which they took an 
oath to support the Constitution.205 This express limitation on state control 
over governance highlights that Section One does not dictate to the states how 
to administer their governments. The Tenth Amendment buttresses this con-
clusion by expressly reserving to the states powers not prohibited by the Con-
stitution.206 The absence in Section One of provisions requiring states to adopt 
particular structures suggests that the states should not be required to adopt 
those structures. 
Nor does the history of the Fourteenth Amendment establish that the 
Amendment was meant to restructure state governments. As others have 
shown, the driving motivation for the Amendment was to prohibit the states 
from discriminating against and violating the rights of individuals.207 But noth-
ing suggests that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment meant through the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause or the Due Process Clause to wrest from the 
states control over allocation of state government powers.208 
At the same time, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that 
the drafters actively sought to avoid unduly interfering with state sovereignty. 
Even the drafters who most strongly favored incorporation of rights against the 
 
205.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3; see also, e.g., id. amend. XV (prohibiting states from limiting the 
right to vote based on race); id. amend. XIX (requiring states to permit women to vote in state elections). 
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment prescribes how federal representatives and electors are to be 
apportioned among the states. Id. amend. XIV, § 2. It does not direct how the states must organize their own 
governments. 
206.  Id. amend. X. 
207.  Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the 
Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 427 (1990) (“The dual purposes of the fourteenth amendment, permeating 
through all of its provisions, were (1) to provide constitutional protection for the fundamental or ‘God-given’ 
or ‘natural’ rights of all United States citizens by (2) radically altering the design of federalism underlying the 
Bill of Rights to invest the federal government with complete authority to punish the infringement of such 
rights by either state or private action.”); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the 
Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 884–90 (1986) (gathering historical evidence to show that 
the motivation for the Amendment was to protect civil rights). Section 1983, passed pursuant to Section Five 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, provided individuals with a cause of action to enforce the individuals’ rights 
conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). 
208.  See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that a 
number of former Supreme Court Justices that “were alert in safeguarding and promoting the interests of 
liberty and human dignity through law” and “were also judges mindful of the relation of our federal system 
to a progressively democratic society and therefore duly regardful of the scope of authority that was left to 
the States even after the Civil War”). 
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states stated that the Amendment incorporated only the first eight amend-
ments209—a view to which the Court still adheres today.210 One explanation for 
the omission of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which reserve to the states 
and people the rights and powers not addressed by the Constitution, is that 
applying these provisions against the states would significantly distort our fed-
eral system. The purpose of those Amendments was to protect state power, yet 
to apply them against the state would curtail state power.211 And as noted earlier, 
a core feature of that state sovereignty was the power to arrange state govern-
ment.212 
The text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, do not pro-
vide an adequate basis to overcome the principle against interfering with the 
states’ ability to arrange their governments. Accordingly, it should not be read 
to incorporate structural rights against the states. Incorporating those structural 
rights would require states to establish government structures and assign pow-
ers to those structures. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment should not be read 
to require states to convene grand juries to issue indictments, to convene petit 
juries to try individuals accused of crimes, or to convene civil juries to try cases 
at common law. 
To be sure, incorporating substantive and procedural provisions in the Bill 
of Rights also intrudes on state sovereignty. But the intrusion from incorporat-
ing structural rights is far greater. Incorporating substantive rights prohibits the 
states only from taking particular types of actions. The Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment, for example, prohibits the states from abridging the free-
dom of speech.213 These rights do constrain state power by prohibiting some 
state actions. But the intrusion on the state is limited in the sense that it only 
prohibits certain substantive actions. The Free Speech Clause, for example, per-
tains to only those state decisions involving the regulation of speech—a small 
sliver of state actions. 
 
209.  Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REV. 801, 877 (2008) 
(stating that John Bingham, who drafted Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, “left both the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments off of his list of individual privileges or immunities protected against state action by 
the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
210.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010) (omitting mention of the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments as among those unincorporated through lack of decision, suggesting a view that they 
could not plausibly apply against the states). 
211.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 606 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment) (“To incorporate [the Tenth Amendment] would be to divest the States of all powers 
not specifically delegated to them, thereby inverting the original import of the Amendment.”); accord McDon-
ald, 561 U.S. at 897 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also AMAR, supra note 4, at 158–57 (making a similar point). 
Some have made a somewhat analogous point about the Establishment Clause. They have argued that the 
Clause meant to protect the states from federal interference with state religions and therefore should not be 
incorporated against the states. See, e.g., Galloway, 572 U.S. at 606–07 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
212.  See supra text accompanying note 143. 
213.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Procedural rights prescribe the procedures a state must follow when taking 
particular actions. For example, the Fourth Amendment requires the govern-
ment ordinarily to obtain a warrant before conducting a search of a house.214 
These rights also constrain state power because they dictate the process the 
state must follow when it performs certain actions. But these intrusions on the 
state are also limited. They simply tell the state institutions that are empowered 
to act the process they must follow when they take particular actions. 
The intrusion on the states by incorporating structural rights is significantly 
greater. Structural rights allocate government power. The structure of a govern-
ment is the defining feature of its sovereignty. The adoption of a particular 
structure reflects the values of the people and can affect a wide variety of gov-
ernment actions. Requiring a state to adopt a unicameral legislature, for exam-
ple, affects every piece of legislation adopted by the state. The importance of 
the Constitution itself reflects the centrality to sovereignty of the ability to ar-
range government power: its primary function was to define the allocation of 
power in the federal government.215 
Incorporating structural rights raises all of these concerns. Whether to as-
sign a judicial decision to a jury or judge turns on a variety of value choices for 
the people about how to allocate the judicial power. Incorporation takes that 
decision away from the citizens of each state and replaces it with the mandates 
in the Bill of Rights. Incorporating structural rights requires states to establish 
particular government institutions before taking certain actions, such as requir-
ing a jury to find facts necessary to increase a criminal defendant’s punishment 
range at sentencing. But, if not for incorporation, the state might choose not to 
create those institutions to exercise those powers. Because of the different con-
siderations that are important to laypeople versus judges, incorporating those 
rights can lead to different outcomes in different cases. Even though most de-
fendants plead guilty and most parties settle civil cases, these effects are felt 
because those decisions are made in the shadow of a jury. 
To be clear, none of this is to say that the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not limit state sovereignty. The Amendment does limit state sovereignty. But it 
does not eliminate the states as sovereigns. One of the core features of sover-
eignty is the power to arrange government. Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not strip states of that power. And while Section Three of 
the Amendment does intrude on this state prerogative to arrange government, 
it does so in an explicit, limited way. 
Incorporating structural rights would also threaten the states’ ability to 
check the federal government. As noted above, the potential for states to adopt 
different forms of government is an important aspect of preserving this role of 
the states. This argument equally applies to the states’ ability to arrange their 
 
214.  Id. amend. IV. 
215.  See, e.g., id. arts. I–III. 
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judicial departments as to their ability to arrange other departments of state 
government. 
One might argue that, even if permitting the states to adopt different gov-
ernment structures usually protects their ability to check the federal govern-
ment, the argument does not extend to juries. After all, one reason for juries is 
to check the government, so requiring them should not impair the states’ ability 
to check the federal government. 
This argument misses the mark. Even if it were true that requiring juries 
would not hamper the states’ power to check the federal government, the struc-
tural nature of juries would still counsel against incorporation. The important 
point is that, as a general matter, requiring states to adopt particular government 
structures does present a risk to the states’ ability to check the federal govern-
ment. One should not dispense with a principle simply because violating the 
principle in a single circumstance does not cause easily identifiable harm. 
But it is not true that requiring juries poses no risk to the states’ ability to 
check the federal government. One can easily imagine scenarios—be it because 
of an increasing drain on judicial resources as more federal criminal statutes are 
enacted or because of government shutdowns that close the federal courts—
under which Congress decides to shunt prosecutions for federal offenses to 
state courts. Likewise, one can imagine a federal official playing on local popu-
lace’s fears to encourage convictions within demographic groups that he op-
poses. In that situation, leaving criminal trials to state judges with more 
information than laypeople on juries could very well present a stronger bulwark 
against the federal government.216 
2. Consistency with Precedent 
A doctrine of not incorporating structural rights also makes better sense of 
the state of the law than the current doctrine does. Under current doctrine, the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates rights that are fundamental or deeply 
rooted in our history. Under that standard, the Fourteenth Amendment should 
incorporate the rights to a grand jury and to a civil jury.217 Those rights are no 
less rooted in our nation’s history than other rights that have been incorporated 
against the states.218 Nevertheless, the Court has refused to incorporate those 
 
216.  Of course, a state judge who knows that prejudice underlies a conviction can overturn that con-
viction. But the judge might not know why the jury convicted and, accordingly, would uphold the conviction 
so long as there was a reasonable basis for doing so. 
217.  See supra notes 65–75 and accompanying text. 
218.  See Thomas, supra note 118, at 1197–99. One argument to justify the nonincorporation of the 
Grand Jury Clause is that only eighteen states today require grand jury indictments for felonies. See, e.g., AMAR, 
supra note 35, at 166 n.*. But that current practice does not establish what is rooted in history, and history 
suggests that grand juries were regarded as essential. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. All states 
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rights. A structural rights approach to incorporation explains the failure to in-
corporate those rights. Those rights are not incorporated because doing so 
would interfere with the states’ prerogative to organize their governments.219 
Recognizing that structural rights should not be incorporated also helps 
explain the doctrinal anomalies surrounding the incorporated right to a jury in 
state criminal prosecutions. Although incorporated rights apply equally against 
the federal and state governments, the Court has not applied the right to a jury 
equally to the state and federal governments. For example, the Court has long 
held that the Sixth Amendment requires jury verdicts to be unanimous in fed-
eral court,220 but it has said that this restriction does not apply to state criminal 
juries.221 One explanation for this conclusion is that the Court recognized that 
requiring unanimity unduly interfered with the states’ ability to administer their 
judicial systems.222 
A similar explanation underlies the Court’s decision relating to the size of 
juries. Although the Court had long held that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed 
a twelve-person jury,223 in Baldwin v. New York, the Court upheld New York’s 
law authorizing criminal trials by juries with six members.224 In his dissent, Jus-
tice Harlan explained that the reason the Court had modified the right was to 
allow the states “elbow room in ordering their own criminal systems.”225 He 
further explained that, although the Court’s decision permitted both the federal 
and state systems to have fewer than twelve jurors, the reason that the Court 
 
required grand juries at the founding, and almost all states required grand jury indictments when the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified. Moreover, to the extent incorporation is meant to change state practices, 
justifying nonincorporation on current state practices turns incorporation on its head. 
219.  Professor Amar argued that one might justify the nonincorporation of the Seventh Amendment 
on the ground that the requirement was meant to require the federal government to follow the state rules of 
juries by giving a person a right to a jury whenever a state court would do so; thus, the argument goes, 
incorporating the Seventh Amendment is unnecessary because it would require only that states follow their 
own jury rules. AMAR, supra note 4, at 276. That is an interesting argument but ultimately one that is hard to 
square with the text. The Seventh Amendment does not say that the federal government must follow the 
state’s practice on providing civil juries. It preserves the right to jury trial at common law. U.S. CONST. amend. 
VII. But as Amar acknowledges, the states did not follow a single common law practice; they varied on when 
a jury was required. AMAR, supra note 4, at 89. To avoid this problem, Amar suggests that state practice was 
the common law. Id. But decisions such as Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), suggest that the common 
law was not viewed simply as state law. 
220.  Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900). 
221.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 766 n.14 (2010) (explaining how the Court reached 
this result). 
222.  There are, of course, good reasons not to require unanimity—such as accommodating ever-in-
creasing diversity among jurors and avoiding mistrials because of recalcitrant jurors. See AMAR, supra note 35, 
at 442–43 (arguing that diversity of jurors counsels against unanimity). But these practicalities do not explain 
the differential treatment between state and federal juries. 
223.  Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898). 
224.  399 U.S. 66 (1970). 
225.  Id. at 118 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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modified the right was to avoid interfering with the state’s administration of its 
government.226 
Both of these anomalies reflect the discomfort with infringing on state sov-
ereignty when the Court incorporates structural rights. Deincorporating the 
right to a criminal jury under a structural rights approach would avoid these 
difficulties altogether. 
3. Responding to Objections 
Although incorporating structural rights curtails the states’ power to allo-
cate government power, one might contend that the Fourteenth Amendment 
nevertheless requires incorporation of those rights. There are three major argu-
ments to support that position. But none of them provides a sound basis for 
incorporating structural rights. 
The first argument is that the goal of the Fourteenth Amendment is to 
protect rights, and protecting rights is more important than protecting the 
states’ power to arrange their governments. But this argument begs the ques-
tion. It rests on the assumption that the Fourteenth Amendment aims to pro-
tect rights, even if doing so interferes with the states’ ability to organize their 
governments. That assumption is not warranted. The Fourteenth Amendment 
no doubt prohibits the states from interfering with some rights. But it does not 
prohibit the states from interfering with all rights. For example, the Court held 
only five years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment that the 
Amendment does not prohibit states from interfering with economic rights, 
explicitly invoking the federalism reasoning that reading the Amendment to 
protect those rights would result in the Court becoming “a perpetual censor 
upon all legislation of the States.”227 Although the Court temporarily reversed 
course during the Lochner era, it returned to its original position only a few dec-
ades later.228 Nor does the Amendment incorporate all common law rights 
against the states.229 If it did, states could not enact legislation modifying the 
elements of common law actions or capping damages in those actions. Nor is 
it any answer to say that the jury rights—especially the right to a criminal jury—
should be incorporated because they are important. The question is whether 
the importance of the right trumps the states’ prerogative to arrange their own 
governments. The principle of preserving state control over state government 
supports answering that question in favor of not incorporating structural rights. 
 
226.  Id. (characterizing the majority’s decision as “diluting constitutional protections” to preserve state 
“elbow room”). 
227.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1872). 
228.  See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (overturning the doctrine of economic rights). 
229.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763 (2010) (stating the Court never adopted full 
incorporation and instead uses a process called “selective incorporation”). 
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The second argument is that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states 
from depriving individuals of life, liberty, or property without due process, and 
providing a jury is a necessary component of due process. The argument is not 
that the Due Process Clause incorporates the jury clauses in the Bill of Rights; 
instead, it is that the Due Process Clause independently requires states to provide 
juries.230 
But that conclusion rests on an uneasy interpretation of the Due Process 
Clause. To start, the term “due process” does not necessarily carry the idea of 
a jury. Historically, due process prohibited the government from arbitrarily act-
ing against individuals, but it did not demand a jury.231 The Supreme Court in-
dicated in its 1855 decision in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 
decided only 13 years before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
that it did not interpret the term that way.232 There, the Court upheld the Treas-
ury Department’s seizure of a customs collector’s property based on the Treas-
ury’s determination that the collector owed the Treasury $1 million.233 In doing 
so, the Court rejected the argument that due process required a jury, concluding 
that the Constitution “contains no description of those processes which it was 
intended to allow or forbid.”234 
Further cutting against reading the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to contain a right to independent rights to juries is that the Clause 
mirrors the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The similarity in lan-
guage suggests that the two clauses should have the same meaning. The natural 
reading of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause is that it does not impose 
jury requirements; otherwise, the jury rights enumerated in the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Seventh Amendments would be redundant.235 To be sure, it is possible to read 
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to require a jury.236 Attorney General 
William Wirt read the Clause this way, stating that it and the specific jury pro-
visions were “positive and repeated provisions” guaranteeing the right to a 
jury.237 But given the presumption against redundancy, it is more natural to read 
 
230.  See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 122, at 1718 (making this argument). 
231.  LUCIUS POLK MCGEHEE, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 5–6, 233 (1906). 
232.  Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855). 
233.  Id. at 285–86. 
234.  Id. at 276. 
235.  Id.; see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884) (arguing that, to avoid rendering the Grand 
Jury Clause “superfluous,” the Court would not read the Due Process Clause to include a grand jury require-
ment). 
236.  See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 122, at 1718 (challenging the approach of “interpret[ing] 
‘due process’ in such a way that it would not overlap with other, more specific procedural provisions”). 
237.  Cadets at West Point, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 276, 276–77 (1819). 
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the clause not to require a jury. The virtually identical language in the Four-
teenth Amendment’s clause suggests that the same reading should be ascribed 
to both clauses.238 
Moreover, to the extent the interpretations of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments do diverge, it should be in the direction of not reading the Four-
teenth Amendment to include a jury requirement. Even if the Fifth Amendment 
were read independently to create rights to a grand jury, criminal jury, and civil 
jury, the Fourteenth Amendment should not be read that way. That reading of 
the Fourteenth Amendment better aligns with the background presumption 
against interfering with the state power to arrange government.239 
The third argument against not incorporating structural rights is that incor-
porating the structural rights under the Fourteenth Amendment does not, by 
its own force, require the states to adopt those structures. Instead, the argument 
goes, it only incorporates the right not to have the states act unless they do so 
through those structures. Thus, one might argue, incorporating the right to a 
criminal jury does not allocate state judicial power to juries in criminal cases; 
instead, it merely prohibits states from trying individuals for crimes unless they 
provide juries. Thus, it is more like a right that prohibits the state from acting 
in a particular way than a structural right. On this view, incorporating the crim-
inal jury right under the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere with the 
states’ prerogative to arrange their governments. 
This objection misses the point. A state cannot allocate its power in a man-
ner inconsistent with the incorporated right. So, even if incorporating the crim-
inal jury right does not entail an affirmative allocation of power, incorporating 
that right still dictates how states may allocate that power. For example, even if 
incorporating the Sixth Amendment does not allocate power to juries, the in-
corporation of that right still prohibits states from allocating the power to de-
cide criminal cases to judges instead of juries. Thus, even if incorporation of 
structural rights only prohibits states from adopting particular structures, as op-
posed to compelling them to adopt particular structures, that incorporation still 
infringes on the states’ power to arrange their governments as they see fit. 
Moreover, there is good reason to think that structural rights do affirma-
tively allocate power. The various jury provisions do not simply protect the 
interests of the individual parties. They also set forth the structure under which 
states are to adjudicate, and they provide opportunities for members of the 
 
238.  In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890) (“[W]hen the same phrase was employed in the Four-
teenth Amendment it was used in the same sense and with no greater extent.”). 
239.  This is not to say that the Due Process Clause places no limits on the way that states administer 
criminal justice. The Due Process Clause prohibits states from taking actions that “shock the conscience.” 
Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1906 (2018) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 
U.S. 833, 849–50 (1998)). For example, authorizing a prosecutor to determine guilt would fail this standard. 
See David A. Suess, Paternalism Versus Pugnacity: The Right to Counsel in Japan and the United States, 72 IND. L.J. 
291, 309 (1996). 
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community to participate in the adjudicatory process.240 This understanding un-
derlies the Supreme Court’s holdings into the twentieth century that defendants 
could not waive the right to criminal juries.241 
Treating structural rights as also affirmatively allocating power is most im-
portant for the right to a civil jury. Because civil suits vindicate individual rights, 
individuals choose whether to bring civil suits. Thus, states have no control 
over the filing of civil suits. If the right to a civil jury were incorporated against 
the states but states refused to provide juries, individuals could not vindicate 
their individual rights in civil suits through the method prescribed by law of a 
jury trial. Because states do not bring all civil cases, states could not avoid the 
obligation to provide civil juries simply by refusing to bring civil cases. The only 
ways that a state could prevent civil juries would be either to abolish all private 
rights or to abolish its state judicial system. The former is not an option because 
some rights are guaranteed by federal law or the Constitution; the latter is not 
an option because it would mean that the state has chosen to relinquish a core 
feature of what makes a government a government and may violate the Guar-
antee Clause and the Due Process Clause. Thus, because incorporating the civil 
jury right would mean that individuals have an entitlement to a jury to resolve 
their civil disputes, incorporation of that right must also implicitly confer power 
on juries to decide civil cases. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
Adopting a theory of not incorporating structural rights would have several 
important implications. First, it would justify the Court’s decisions not to in-
corporate the Civil and Grand Jury Clauses. Preserving that status quo would 
ensure going forward that states have broad leeway to develop procedures for 
charging crimes and trying civil cases. Second, and much more significant, 
adopting this theory would result in the deincorporation of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury in criminal cases. That deincorporation would not only 
mean that states would no longer be obligated to provide a jury in criminal 
cases; it would also mean that decisions like Apprendi that restrict judicial fact-
finding at sentencing would no longer apply to the states. 
A. Civil Juries 
None of the various incorporation theories addressed by the Court pro-
vides a sound justification for its consistent refusal to incorporate the Seventh 
Amendment right to a civil jury while incorporating other provisions of the Bill 
 
240.  See supra notes 127–28, 137–39 and accompanying text. 
241.  Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 353–54 (1898); Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 
(1874). The Court overturned this line of cases in Patton v. United States. 281 U.S. 276, 293 (1930). 
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of Rights.242 Adopting a theory of not incorporating structural rights, however, 
would provide a legal foundation for that decision. Under the structural rights 
theory, incorporation would be inappropriate because it would require the 
states to create and empower a new government structure, usurping essential 
aspects of state sovereignty. Thus, the structural rights theory not only justifies 
but also aligns better with the Court’s current precedent. 
Not incorporating the Seventh Amendment against the states has the ad-
vantage of preserving their ability to experiment with different systems to re-
solve civil disputes. It is by no means obvious that the jury system in the Seventh 
Amendment represents the best way to resolve civil disputes. Commentators 
have raised various criticisms of juries. They have argued that, among other 
things, juries cause delays in the resolution of cases, are expensive, render deci-
sions that are inconsistent with the law, and are generally unpredictable.243 Over 
the years, these concerns have led to several concerted efforts to abolish jury 
trials.244 
Consistent with these criticisms, the Court has significantly curtailed the 
role of civil juries in federal cases over the years. It has expanded the role of 
summary judgment and judgments as a matter of law.245 Both devices diminish 
the role of the jury by allowing judges to enter verdicts based on their own 
evaluation of the evidence. Additionally, although the Constitution forbids 
judges from second-guessing jury verdicts, the Court has recognized exceptions 
to that prohibition. For instance, it has permitted judges to reduce jury awards 
through the process of remittitur.246 
To be sure, even though the Seventh Amendment is not incorporated 
against the states, many states have enacted their own laws providing for civil 
 
242.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764–65, 765 n.13 (2010) (“Our governing decisions 
regarding the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury require-
ment long predate the era of selective incorporation.”). Justice Stevens, in dissent, noted that the Court has 
consistently denied certiorari to review incorporation of these provisions: “While those denials have no prec-
edential significance, they confirm the proposition that the ‘incorporation’ of a provision of the Bill of Rights 
into the Fourteenth Amendment does not, in itself, mean the provision must have precisely the same meaning 
in both contexts.” Id. at 868 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
243.  See DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE 146–47, 162 (2016). 
244.  See, e.g., Kent, supra note 152, at 398–99 (recounting the early-twentieth-century efforts to abolish 
jury trials). 
245.  David R. Fine et al., The “Vanishing” Civil Jury Trial, 80 PA. BAR ASS’N Q. 24, 32–33 (2009). 
246.  The Court has also held that judges may set aside jury verdicts that are inconsistent with the law, 
so long as the movant moved for judgment as a matter of law before the verdict. See Neely v. Martin K. Eby 
Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322 (1967). A similar process was recognized at common law, see Balt. & Carolina 
Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 660 (1935), though at common law the theory was that the judge reserved 
ruling on the motion until the verdict was entered, id., while under the current practice a judge may enter a 
judgment non obstante veredicto even if he ruled on the earlier motion for judgment as a matter of law, see FED. 
R. CIV. P. 50(b). 
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juries. But those state rights are not identical to the rights conferred by the Sev-
enth Amendment.247 More important, because those civil jury rights are the 
product of state law, states can choose to modify or abrogate them in the fu-
ture.248 
Not incorporating the civil jury right also preserves the ability of the states 
to develop equity. The law has long distinguished between legal and equitable 
proceedings. For example, the two traditionally involve different procedures, 
and courts have broader remedial discretion in suits at equity.249 The Seventh 
Amendment confers a right to a jury in suits that were heard by courts of law 
in 1791, not suits that were heard by courts of equity.250 Today, this means that 
courts employ a historical test, looking backward to the law of 1791, to deter-
mine whether a proceeding is legal or equitable and, thus, whether the Seventh 
Amendment requires a jury.251 
But the line between law and equity has not been static. Before the adoption 
of the Bill of Rights, actions occasionally crossed the line between law and eq-
uity, and that process has continued in some states.252 It is unlikely that the line 
between law and equity in 1791 is optimal for today’s world, but incorporating 
the Amendment would not fix that line in the states. Under the Court’s current 
precedent and under the structural rights theory, the states are not constrained 
by the Seventh Amendment’s historical test, even though they may have a sim-
ilar constraint in their own state constitution. The difference is that not incor-
porating the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury leaves the states free to 
modify that right under their own state constitutions, preserving essential fea-
tures of state sovereignty. 
Related, not incorporating the Seventh Amendment also provides states 
with broader flexibility to expand actions to address new types of harms. Under 
the Seventh Amendment, parties have a right to a jury if the parties would have 
 
247.  See Eric J. Hamilton, Federalism and the State Civil Jury Rights, 65 STAN. L. REV. 851, 856 (2013) 
(noting that some states hold that their constitutions protect the right to a jury “as it was at the time the state 
constitution was adopted” as opposed to in 1791). 
248.  Subject to other independent constraints in the Constitution. 
249.  The importance of that discretion is reflected in the Court’s conclusion that the Erie doctrine 
does not require federal courts to follow state law in fashioning equitable remedies. See Guaranty Tr. Co. v. 
York, 326 U.S. 99, 106 (1945) (“State law cannot define the remedies which a federal court must give simply 
because a federal court in diversity jurisdiction is available as an alternative tribunal to the State’s courts.”). 
250.  U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, . . . the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served . . . .”); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336–37 (1966) (“[I]n equity, there is no Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial . . . .” (citations omitted)); 
251.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). Under this test, the Court 
determines, “first, whether [it is] dealing with a cause of action that either was tried at law at the time of the 
founding or is at least analogous to one that was.” Id. 
252.  Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 658 (1963) (“Before the 
adoption of the constitutions the line between law and equity (and therefore between jury and non-jury trial) 
was not a fixed and static one.”). Moreover, even under the Court’s historical test, the line between law and 
equity is not always clear. The Court has had difficulty distinguishing between the two in several cases, and 
courts and commentators continue to disagree how to characterize various actions for restitution. 
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had a right to have that dispute heard by a jury in 1791.253 But changes in tech-
nology and resources have vastly increased the complexity of common law suits 
that were traditionally heard by juries. Even though a jury may have been well-
suited to resolve a particular type of suit in the eighteenth century, that does 
not mean a jury is well-suited to resolve that suit in the twenty-first century. For 
example, a jury of individuals without technical expertise may be well-suited to 
resolve a dispute where the underlying claim is that Dan defrauded Paul in the 
sale of land. That same jury, however, may be significantly less well equipped 
to resolve a dispute where the underlying claim is securities fraud. Instead, the 
state might find it favorable to have a judge, especially one that is well versed 
in cases of securities fraud, decide that particular dispute. But if the Seventh 
Amendment is incorporated, then the states are obligated to provide a jury in 
that case. The obligation to provide a civil jury increases the cost to the states, 
which, in turn, decreases the states’ incentive to expand actions to cover new 
types of harm. 
B. Grand Juries 
Adopting a theory of not incorporating structural rights would similarly 
justify the Court’s decisions not to incorporate the Fifth Amendment right to a 
grand jury. As with the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury, none of the 
incorporation theories propounded by the Court provides a sound justification 
for those decisions. Under the structural rights theory, however, not incorpo-
rating the Grand Jury Clause is justified because to incorporate that right would 
require states to create and assign power to the government structure of a grand 
jury. 
Not requiring states to provide grand juries leaves states with discretion 
about how to administer their criminal justice system. As with the civil jury 
right, commentators have heavily criticized grand juries. They have argued that 
grand juries are no longer an effective check on prosecutorial overreach but 
instead have become a tool of the executive branch.254 These critics note that 
grand juries decide whether to indict based solely on evidence presented by the 
prosecutor255 and that grand juries almost always indict when prosecutors bring 
 
253.  Markman, 517 U.S. at 376 (“[T]he right of trial by jury . . . is the right which existed under the 
English common law when the Amendment was adopted.”). The dispute of course must also exceed $20. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
254.  See, e.g., United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
255.  Note, Restoring Legitimacy: The Grand Jury as the Prosecutor’s Administrative Agency, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1205, 1208 (2017). 
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charges.256 Adding insult to injury, grand juries now function as a shield to pro-
tect prosecutors from public scrutiny because of the requirements that grand 
juries operate in secret.257 
Of course, although the courts have not incorporated the Grand Jury 
Clause, grand juries are common in the states. All states rely on grand juries to 
some extent.258 But they also employ other means of charging crimes. Nearly 
two-thirds of states permit felonies to be charged by information.259 Addition-
ally, the right to a grand jury under state law is not always identical to the Fifth 
Amendment right. Only eighteen states provide for the grand jury right in the 
state constitution.260 In some states, such as New York,261 the right is the same 
right as the federal right. In other states the right is different. For example, the 
California constitution requires that each county convene grand juries, but it 
does not specify the functions of those grand juries, and those grand juries do 
not have the exclusive power to pass on any criminal charges.262 Moreover, in 
most states, the right to a grand jury is statutory.263 This allows states not only 
to provide a grand jury right different from the Fifth Amendment grand jury 
right but also to more easily change their charging process if they find it inef-
fective. 
Not incorporating the grand jury right also continues to leave the states 
with greater leeway in considering criminal justice reform. For example, the sig-
nificant costs associated with imprisonment might lead states to consider new 
types of punishment for crimes. Under the Fifth Amendment, the federal gov-
ernment is required to empanel a grand jury to indict for capital or infamous 
crimes.264 If the Fifth Amendment were selectively incorporated, then the states 
would be obliged to do the same. The subjective nature of what constitutes a 
sufficiently stigmatic punishment makes it difficult to predict whether the Court 
would deem those new punishments infamous. Moreover, as the Supreme 
Court has made clear, what constitutes an infamous crime can change over time. 
Especially because those reforms are driven by cost concerns, the risk that new 
punishments might be deemed infamous and therefore require states to bear 
the costs of providing a grand jury may discourage these types of reforms. 
 
256.  Id. at 1210 (“Grand juries declined to indict in 11 out of 162,351 federal cases in 2010.”). 
257.  Id. at 1209. 
258.  Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community: A Case for Grand Jury Independence, 3 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 67, 97–98 (1995). 
259.  4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 14.2(d), at 341. 
260.  Id. § 14.2(c), at 337. 
261.  N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous 
crime . . . .”). 
262.  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“One or more grand juries shall be drawn and summoned at least once 
a year in each county.”). 
263.  See SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:1 (2d ed. 1997), Westlaw 
(updated Dec. 2018). 
264.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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C. Criminal Juries 
Undoubtedly, the most significant change resulting from the adoption of 
the structural rights theory is that it would require deincorporation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to a criminal jury. Unlike the implications discussed in the 
previous Subparts, this could significantly change the criminal justice system in 
many states. No longer applying this right against the states would mean that 
states are no longer obliged under the Constitution to provide a jury to try a 
person for a crime carrying more than a six-month sentence of imprisonment. 
States accordingly could authorize judges instead of juries to try all criminal 
charges. More important, it would significantly increase state discretion in de-
signing their sentencing systems. 
Although far from a trivial change, it is important not to overstate the effect 
of dispensing with the obligation to provide a jury for criminal trials. Currently, 
all fifty states have a right to a criminal jury in their own state constitutions.265 
Most states have held that their respective jury-trial rights apply in the same 
situations as the Sixth Amendment right,266 though some states have differed. 
For example, Arizona and Hawaii have held that the state jury trial right applies 
to offenses historically deemed to be serious regardless of the punishment they 
carry.267 These state constitutional provisions would continue to require juries 
to try criminal cases even if the Sixth Amendment were deincorporated. 
To be sure, it is possible that if the Sixth Amendment no longer applied, 
some states might amend their constitutions not to require juries in criminal 
cases. The theory is that those states retain the right to a jury in their constitu-
tions only because they are already obliged to provide a jury under the Consti-
tution. Following the structural rights theory, it is entirely possible that a state 
might remove the criminal jury right from its own constitution. But this seems 
unlikely, or at least unlikely to be widespread. One does not hear broad clam-
oring in the states for the eradication of juries in criminal cases. Instead, it may 
be true that states maintain a right to a jury in their constitutions—even though 
the Constitution already provides for one—because they view the criminal jury 
right as important. That seems especially so in states that confer broader jury 
rights than the Sixth Amendment. 
Moreover, even if deincorporation did result in more state criminal cases 
being tried by judges instead of juries, that switch would not have a significant 
effect in the vast majority of criminal cases. Over 90% of criminal convictions 
 
265.  See Calabresi et al., supra note 74, at 111 n.305 (listing all fifty state constitutional provisions). 
266.  Thomas v. State, 331 A.2d 147, 150 (Del. 1975) (“The majority of states follow the guidelines of 
the United States Supreme Court in interpreting their respective state constitutional provisions regarding right 
to trial by jury in contempt proceedings.”). 
267.  Derendal v. Griffith, 104 P.3d 147, 150 (Ariz. 2005); State v. O’Brien, 704 P.2d 883, 885 (Haw. 
1985). Some states have recognized additional procedural requirements for their juries. For example, Dela-
ware’s constitution more strictly limits the use of alternate jurors in criminal cases. Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 
1278, 1298 (Del. 1991). 
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are the result of guilty pleas instead of trials.268 That rate is roughly the same for 
charges that would be tried by a judge and charges that would be tried by a 
jury269—though some jurisdictions vary.270 Thus, even if deincorporation of the 
Sixth Amendment shuttled more cases to judges instead of juries, that change 
would not significantly affect the process by which most convictions are ob-
tained under the current system. 
A much more significant effect of deincorporating the criminal jury right 
would be on sentencing law. According to the Supreme Court, the Sixth 
Amendment significantly limits the procedures courts may follow at sentencing. 
In a line of decisions beginning with the 2000 decision in Apprendi v. New Jer-
sey,271 the Court held that the Sixth Amendment prohibits judges from making 
factual findings that are necessary to increase the punishment range that an of-
fender faces. The theory is that a fact that increases the penalty for a crime is 
an “element” of that crime and therefore must be submitted to the jury under 
the Sixth Amendment.272 Judges accordingly cannot find facts necessary to in-
crease the maximum possible sentence an offender can receive, nor can they 
find facts necessary to increase the minimum possible sentence an offender may 
receive.273 Only a jury can make those factual findings. This doctrinal develop-
ment invalidated many state sentencing schemes that authorized sentencing-
range increases based on judge-found facts,274 as well as a number of state 
schemes authorizing judges to impose the death penalty based on their own 
factual findings.275 
Deincorporating the Sixth Amendment would remove this prohibition on 
state sentencing schemes because the Sixth Amendment would no longer apply 
against the states. States could authorize judges to find facts that alter the sen-
 
268.  Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). 
269.  The state misdemeanor plea rate is slightly higher. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decrimi-
nalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2015) (noting that the “ninety-five percent plea rate generates mil-
lions of convictions without the kinds of procedural or evidentiary checks on which we typically rely to ensure 
accuracy and fairness”); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1052 
(2013) (describing the petty offense system as a “speedy, low-scrutiny process in which outcomes are largely 
predetermined”). 
270.  Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 
711, 732 (2017) (suggesting that the lower plea rate in Philadelphia misdemeanors is due to those charges 
being tried by judge instead of jury). 
271.  530 U.S. 466, 489 (2000). 
272.  Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013). 
273.  Id. 
274.  See, e.g., Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 
(2004); Brown v. State, No. SC18-323, 2018 WL 6696034, at *2 (Fla. Dec. 20, 2018) (invalidating portions of 
Florida’s sentencing laws); see also John F. Pfaff, The Future of Appellate Sentencing Review: Booker in the States, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 683, 700 (2009) (noting that the Court’s sentencing doctrines have “invalidated guideline 
systems in thirteen states”). 
275.  See, e.g., Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (invalidating Florida’s capital sentencing scheme); 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (striking down Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme). 
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tencing range. Removing this limitation on sentencing would be extremely sig-
nificant because judges must sentence all defendants, including those who plead 
guilty. Of course, states could interpret their own state constitutions to impose 
the same jury requirement as that imposed by the Sixth Amendment. But they 
would not be obliged to interpret their constitutions that way, and there is good 
reason to think at least some would not. Consider that the Court’s interpretation 
of the Sixth Amendment is of recent vintage and has been highly contested. 
This is not to say that the Apprendi doctrine would not impose any limits 
on state sentencing procedures. Apprendi suggested that, aside from the Sixth 
Amendment requirement that juries find sentencing facts, the Due Process 
Clause requires that facts increasing sentencing ranges be found beyond a rea-
sonable doubt276—though later decisions suggest that the requirement derives 
from the Sixth Amendment itself.277 Assuming the requirement does derive 
from the Due Process Clause, then applying the structural rights theory to de-
incorporate the Sixth Amendment would not affect that requirement because 
the Due Process Clause applies to the states by its own terms. Thus, sentencing 
facts would still have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. But deincorpo-
ration would permit judges instead of juries to make those beyond-a-reasona-
ble-doubt determinations. 
CONCLUSION 
Structural rights should not be incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Although structural rights confer individual rights, forcing states 
to observe those rights dictates how the states must arrange their governments. 
One of the principles underlying the Constitution is that the states retain their 
prerogative to organize their governments. This principle informs many doc-
trines of constitutional law, leading courts to recognize implicit exceptions to 
otherwise unqualified provisions. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment 
should not be read to overturn this principle implicitly. Although the amend-
ment requires states to observe individual rights, it should not be read to dis-
pense with the states’ prerogative to arrange their own governments. 
 
276.  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he 
is charged[.]” (first alteration in original) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970))); see, e.g., Robinson 
v. State, 215 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (stating that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement 
does not derive from the Sixth Amendment). 
277.  Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111 (“[T]he Sixth Amendment provides defendants with the right to have a 
jury find those facts beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Dyson, 360 P.3d 25, 29 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) 
(“When coupled with the command of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth 
Amendment demands that an impartial jury find beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the charged offense 
for the defendant to be convicted.” (emphasis added) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Winship, 397 U.S. at 
364)). 
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No doubt, the biggest concern with refusing to incorporate the jury trial 
rights is the view that it will remove a critical mechanism for preventing abuses 
by state governments. But it is hardly obvious that this is so. Even leaving aside 
the fact that the laws of many states provide jury rights roughly comparable to 
those in the Bill of Rights, juries have not proven to be an essential protection 
against the government. Grand juries have notoriously become a tool of shield-
ing prosecutors instead of a constraint on prosecutors. And one does not hear 
complaints about civil trials conducted by judges instead of juries. 
And while criminal juries do sometimes pose a more significant check on 
the government, it is important to recognize the limited role they play. Few 
cases go to criminal juries because of plea bargaining. The principal function of 
the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury today is to prohibit sentencing 
schemes under which the maximum potential sentence depends on judicial fact-
finding. But this doctrine does not guarantee an increased role for the jury. For 
example, the federal fix to accommodate this doctrine was not to enlarge the 
role of the jury but, instead, was simply to increase the discretion of sentencing 
judges. It is hardly clear that this regime, under which different judges with dif-
ferent views can impose different sentences on similarly situated offenders, is 
preferable to one in which they are obliged to impose particular sentences based 
on their factual findings.278 Nor would deincorporating the criminal jury give 
states unbridled discretion in the few cases that do go to trial. Other provisions 
that unquestionably do apply to the states, such as the Due Process Clause itself, 




278.  See Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? 
Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1306–07 (2014) (concluding that sentencing disparity doubled 
after the sentencing guidelines became advisory). Indeed, the data suggests that the decision to render the 
guidelines nonbinding has resulted in more racially disparate sentences. See Patti B. Saris, So Much Accomplished, 
So Much Left to Do: A Retrospective on Six Years as Chair of the United States Sentencing Commission, 87 UMKC L. 
REV. 145, 156 (2018). 
